

BACEVICH: WHY BUSH CAN'T REMEMBER VIETNAM ■ BUYING CAFTA

SEPTEMBER 26, 2005

The American Conservative

SPLITTING ISLAM

**A Shi'ite-Sunni Strategy
for Surviving the
War on Terror**

By James Kurth

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.N.-AMERICAN

I just got finished reading "Bush vs. Benedict" (Aug. 29), and I have to say it is an inconsistent piece. As a Catholic conservative and not a neocon, I do not support the war, as it furthers the globalist agenda. Yet in this piece, though the neo-Right gaggle are rightly castigated, I cannot help but laugh when the author uncritically quotes Cardinal Ratzinger as stating that only the U.N. should have been used as the international authority to go to war.

The American conservative position has always been, and rightly so, that the only good purpose for the U.N. is to bulldoze it into the Hudson River or to use its facilities as an insane asylum for broken-down international Marxists. How can this author on the one hand castigate the neos and then uphold Benedict XVI's position on such a fraudulent socialist farce as the U.N.?

CRAIG TOWNS
via e-mail

Daniel McCarthy replies:

One need not admire the United Nations in the least to see Pope Benedict XVI's point in suggesting that it would have been the proper body to authorize military action against Iraq. The nature of the menace Iraq allegedly posed, that of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, is of consequence to the whole world. The U.N. Security Council, for all its failings, has a clear interest in preventing state-sponsored terrorists from obtaining nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Russians and the Chinese have had their own sorrowful encounters with Islamism, of course. That the administration could not convince the Security Council of the need for war, and hardly even tried, is an indication of just how weak its case was from the start.

WHY THEY HATE US

I applaud Congressman John "Jimmy" Duncan Jr. of Tennessee ("Volunteer Statesman," Sept. 12) for his vote against

the unnecessary and ill-advised war in Iraq. Duncan is exactly correct when he states, "It's ridiculous to say that the terrorists are a threat to us because they hate our freedom. They don't hate our freedom. They hate our policies in the Middle East."

Osama Bin Laden has been clear and consistent in his criticism of the U.S. First is our decades-long support of Israel's occupation and oppression of the Palestinians. Second is the fact that our troops went into Saudi Arabia and now are in Iraq killing Muslims. Until we are willing to become an honest broker for peace and a sovereign nation rather than the invading, occupying empire that the neocons have made us, we will never be secure either at home or abroad.

RAY GORDON
Baltimore, Md.

FAITH BASED AND DUMBED DOWN

At the center of Austin Bramwell's article "Defining Conservatism Down" (Aug. 29) is a vital sentence: "Conservatives already know what they believe and no longer need anyone to explain it for them." Indeed, the article refers frequently to what conservatives believe rather than what they think. Bramwell points out the danger but does not suggest how to get people concentrating on what they think, with all the uncomfortable business of having to re-examine their thoughts, rather than sitting back comfortably on what they believe. With like-minded people in command in the country's executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, people feel no great urgency to do otherwise.

Perhaps the danger is that so much official policy is now "faith-based." Even for conservatives, the current central position of religion in public life may not be conducive to clear thinking.

JACK ALTMAN
via e-mail

Austin Bramwell replies:

Mr. Altman implicitly blames religion for conservatism's intellectual torpor. This is a mistake. Historically, religious ideas have inspired inquiry as often as they have impeded it—think only of Kepler's mysticism or LeMaitre's Thomism. There is no reason *a priori* to think that religion in general obstructs the pursuit of truth (and at least some reasons for reaching the opposite conclusion). Religion is a complex phenomenon, and its influences on scientific inquiry too multifarious to reduce to a simple formula.

Christianity, incidentally, I take to be an empirical and scientific faith. Paul admonishes that if Christ is not risen, the Christian's faith is in vain. Thus, if the best science of the day does not support the view that a man named Jesus Christ rose from the dead in first-century Palestine, then nobody should call himself a Christian.

BAD TRADE

I am a Republican who is disappointed in the passage of CAFTA. I believe the negative results of NAFTA are self-evident, and the case cannot be made that the U.S. benefited in any significant measure. CAFTA further exacerbates the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs and the exodus of companies. In return, we get Mexico flouting our immigration laws, narco-violence at the edge of Laredo, illegal and violent Salvadoran MS-13 gang members, and Venezuela threatening a trade war. CAFTA and illegal immigration will hurt the GOP in '08, and my party seems oblivious.

R. JONES
Gulfport, Miss.

The American Conservative welcomes letters to the editor. Submit by e-mail to letters@amconmag.com, by fax to 703-875-3350, or by mail to 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209. Please include your name, address, and phone number. We reserve the right to edit all correspondence for space and clarity.



ZUMA PRESS

[COVER]

Splitting Islam

BY JAMES KURTH Winning the Cold War required playing the Soviets off the Chinese. Now we need to divide the Sunnis and the Shi'ites. **Page 7**

[WAR]

Vietnam Generation

BY ANDREW J. BACEVICH Those who fought and those who protested learned the lessons of the '60s. Members of the administration had "other priorities." **Page 13**

[LITERATURE]

Casualties of Waugh

BY R.J. STOVE The cantankerous English writer should be celebrated for his nonfiction as well as his novels. **Page 22**

COLUMNS

6 Patrick J. Buchanan: Losing by winning

35 Taki: Gertrude Bell started it all

NEWS & VIEWS

4 **Fourteen Days:** When Doves Camp; Continued Progress in Iraq; Running for President of Mexico—in L.A.

15 **Feature:** Enoch Powell's prediction of Britain's multicultural turmoil cost him his career, but history vindicates his foresight.

27 **Deep Background:** Chasing Osama—and Red Herrings; Crossing to Jordan; Making Botulinum Isn't Easy

ARTICLES

20 **Scott McConnell:** If we're serious about controlling the border, we must first police our own movement.

26 **W. James Antle III:** CAFTA passage required generous helpings of pork.

ARTS & LETTERS

28 **Steve Sailer:** Ralph Fiennes and Rachel Weisz in "The Constant Gardener"

29 **Roger D. McGrath:** *1776* by David McCullough

31 **Arthur Versluis:** *No Country for Old Men* by Cormac McCarthy

33 **David Cowan:** *How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization* by Thomas E. Woods Jr.

[PEACE]

THE SHEEHAN SPARK


Only months ago, *TAC* lamented the absence of a serious antiwar movement capable of putting the brakes on a reckless foreign policy. Suddenly, emerging from the humid tangle of Camp Casey, there is one. We aren't proposing sainthood for Cindy Sheehan; the grieyed mother of a fallen soldier has said quite a few things that no experienced, media-savvy protest leader would say.

But her defiance, her simple rebuffed request for a meeting with the president, has somehow jumpstarted a national conversation. President Bush became concerned enough about this new consciousness to sacrifice a few of his precious vacation days to deliver boilerplate "stay the course" speeches. The War Party media machine went into code red offensive against Sheehan, a task it evidently finds more amenable than trying to defend Bush's war policy itself.

We hope the antiwar movement grows beyond Cindy Sheehan and the indisputably leftwing types who (quite effectively) helped organize her Crawford vigil. It might not have gotten started without this aggrieved mother prone to overstatement. But it needs more tempered leadership—political leaders who understand that every word will be parsed or misrepresented by an unrelenting spin machine, and who can still convey what a foreign-policy disaster Bush has pushed the country into and propose a way out of it. The movement needs to be Middle American in flavor and content—it needs, in great part, to be conservative as well as liberal. There needs to be more of this: opposition to a crazed foreign policy must be vocal, mainstream, impossible to ignore.

The accomplishment of Cindy Sheehan, which no one can take away, is to have put antiwar dissent on the front pages. May it stay there until we are gone from Iraq.

MORE PROOF OF **RAPID PROGRESS** IN IRAQ



[WAR]

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS

Call it Light at the End of the Tunnel #36. Iraq has a constitution—an "amazing event" according to President Bush, who compared the drafters to America's Founding Fathers. The locals are less enthused, or perhaps enthused in the other direction if protestors packing the streets are any indication. Signs reading "No, No to the Constitution" aren't just practicing that nifty new freedom of speech.

Sunni Arabs involved in drafting the document refused to endorse it and have asked the UN and the Arab League to intervene. Meanwhile, Moqtada al-Sadr's Shi'ite followers are rallying supporters to reject the constitution in the Oct. 15 referendum.

The merits of the document divide even the war's American supporters. Some fret that the obligation to conform all law to the "fixed principles of Islam" *de facto* establishes an Islamic republic. "The American public is not going to sacrifice for such a regime, nor will it do justice for the promises and vision articulated eloquently by President Bush that Iraq be a new democratic model for the region," Freedom House's Nina Shea told the *New York Sun*. But Michael Ledeen is optimistic, calling it "a revolutionary document" (his highest compliment?) that "explicitly protects minority

rights, proclaims gender equality, and defends not only freedom of religion but freedom of conscience."

Either may be correct—and it may not matter. The draft's first day out, 15 people were dragged from their vehicle and executed on the road to Fallujah. Where lawlessness reins, pretty words on paper won't conjure a national identity or keep civil war at bay—no matter which tribe dips the most fingers in purple ink.

[MILITARY]

NEWSPEAK 2005

War is peace. Freedom is slavery. Ignorance is strength. "This deployment is in support of continued progress. We are reinforcing success"—so said Pentagon spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Venable in announcing that two infantry battalions from the 82nd Airborne Division will be shipping out to join the 138,000 American soldiers still in Iraq. One wonders how many boots even more resounding triumph might require.

[IMMIGRATION]

WHERE THE DUCKS ARE

In California, the presidential campaign season comes early. But these aren't American candidates visiting Los Angeles by way of New Hampshire. These contenders are instead vying to become president of Mexico.

For the first time, Mexicans living abroad will be eligible to vote in their home country's elections by absentee ballot. Candidates from all three major parties have been making the trek north to appeal to this potentially decisive bloc.

But this is not just a novelty of peculiar interest to Mexican politics; it has concrete implications for the integrity of the American nation-state. According to estimates in Mexico City, Mexicans living in the U.S. will cast three to five million ballots in the 2006 elections. Millions more are living here to reap economic benefits while Mexico retains their primary allegiance. Assimilation is often touted as the panacea for all our immigration problems, yet there are vast numbers of legal and illegal immigrants in this country who identify as citizens of a foreign power. And the White House intends to import many more through its guest-worker proposals.

This development is the clearest example yet the Mexican government doesn't respect our borders much more than illegal aliens do—and that our own government still fails to appreciate the significance of this problem.

[NEOCONS]

HISTORY REPEATS

Two purple hearts and a bronze star later, Sen. Chuck Hagel knows what Vietnam was like. So when Hagel told ABC's "This Week" that Iraq is starting to resemble Vietnam, we were inclined to take him seriously. Sending more U.S. troops to the country will not help, he said: "We're past that stage now because now we are locked into a bogged-down problem not ... dissimilar to where we were in Vietnam. ... The longer we stay there, the more similarities are going to come together."

For this, Michael Ledeen—who like most of the chief neoconservatives was conspicuously absent during the Viet-

nam conflict—proposed giving Hagel the "Jimmy Carter Appeasement Award for 2005." "The man has never met a tyrant he didn't want to negotiate with," he wrote on National Review Online. This was too rich even for Ledeen's readers, who hit him with "more than the usual quantity of emails presuming ... [that] somehow people with military experience have special authority on the subject of war and peace." Special authority? Not necessarily; but Hagel and others who paid the price for the follies of yesteryear's armchair field marshals certainly might get a special sense of *déjà vu*.

[POLITICS]

SACRED ELEPHANTS

When Pennsylvania's General Assembly voted itself a pay raise of more than 30 percent—without debate and arguably in violation of the state constitution—a conservative activist group came to the taxpayers' defense.

Young Conservatives of Pennsylvania (YCOP) blitzed the districts of pro-pay-hike legislators with news releases, radio ads, and billboards, targeting pols without regard to party affiliation. This has pitted them against the legislature's Republican leadership, whose response has been to smear YCOP as a group of extremists, try to intimidate the organization's leaders, and in the case of an aide to the senate president pro tempore, threaten them with a lawsuit.

That litigious aide says it is "absurd that a conservative group would target Republican leaders who have helped maintain the Republican majority in the senate for almost 25 years" and "a stupid mission if one believes in conservative principles and conservatism because it is the Republican Party that preserves those ideas." That is, he might have added, except when the GOP is working against conservative principles in the Keystone State. ■

The American Conservative

Founding Editor
Taki Theodoracopoulos

Editor and Publisher
Scott McConnell

Executive Editor
Kara Hopkins

Assistant Editors
W. James Antle III
Daniel McCarthy

Film Critic
Steve Sailer

Contributing Editors

Andrew J. Bacevich, Doug Bandow, Richard Cummings, Michael Desch, Philip Giralddi, Paul Gottfried, Leon Hadar, Peter Hitchens, Christopher Layne, Eric S. Margolis, James P. Pinkerton, Justin Raimondo, Fred Reed, R.J. Stove, Thomas E. Woods Jr., John Zmirak

Art Director
Mark Graef

Publishing Consultant
Ronald E. Burr

Office Manager
Veronica Yanos

Copy Assistant
John W. Greene

Editor Emeritus
Patrick J. Buchanan

The American Conservative, Vol. 4, No. 18, September 26, 2005 (ISSN 1540-966X). Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off. TAC is published 24 times per year, biweekly (except for January and August) for \$49.97 per year by The American Conservative, LLC, 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA, 22209. Periodicals postage paid at Arlington, VA, and additional mailing offices. Printed in the United States of America. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 9030, Maple Shade, NJ 08052-9030.

Subscription rates: \$49.97 per year (24 issues) in the U.S., \$54.97 in Canada (U.S. funds), and \$69.97 other foreign (U.S. funds). Back issues: \$6.00 (prepaid) per copy in USA, \$7.00 in Canada (U.S. funds).

For subscription orders, payments, and other subscription inquiries—

By phone: **800-579-6148**
(outside the U.S./Canada 856-488-5321)

Via Web: www.amconmag.com

By mail: *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 9030, Maple Shade, NJ 08052-9030

When ordering a subscription please allow 4–6 weeks for delivery of your first issue and all subscription transactions.

Inquiries and letters to the editor should be sent to letters@amconmag.com. For advertising sales or editorial call 703-875-7600.

This issue went to press on September 1, 2005.
Copyright 2005 *The American Conservative*.

What Soldiers Cannot Do

Speaking to “a boisterous and supportive crowd” at Fort Irwin, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld confidently predicted, “The U.S. military is not

going to lose a battle or a war over there.”

Rumsfeld is right. But he could say the same of Vietnam. In not a single major engagement did the North Vietnamese defeat the U.S. military. Yet we lost South Vietnam as decisively as the French lost the North in 1954, though the French army had been forced to surrender at Dienbienphu—and ours was undefeated.

Even though the U.S. military is not going to lose a battle, that is not decisive as to whether we are going to win this war—that is, leave behind a nation united, democratic, and pro-American. If Iraq has demonstrated anything, it is the limits of military power.

In conventional war, America is invincible. With our stand-off missiles, the one-shot, one-kill weapons of our tanks, laser-guided bombs, and the ability of U.S. soldiers to put precision fire on enemy targets, no army on earth can stand up in fixed battle against ours. Sending the U.S. military against the Iraqi army was like sending the Pittsburgh Steelers against P.S. 39.

But the world knows this. And unlike the Taliban, who tried to defend hilltops against a Northern Alliance supported by American air power, the Iraqis ceded the battlefield. They waited for us to become an occupying power and then they emulated the Apache, using mobility, stealth, surprise, and terror to fight a new war. Unfortunately, there are thousands of these Apache, they are 5,000 miles away, and they live on land no American covets.

To the enemy, victory does not require a Dienbienphu with U.S. generals surrendering to insurgent commanders. That is not going to happen. Victory means merely when we go home, they survive as the most effective fighting force left behind.

Here we face a paradox. While our war in Iraq is killing and capturing the enemy, it is also training the enemy for the war that comes after our departure. We are teaching them how to fight the greatest army on earth, excellent training for when they have to fight the Iraqi army.

And there is in history no assurance of the ultimate victory in which Rumsfeld has such confidence. Since 1945, insurgencies have inflicted repeated defeats on occupying powers with superior armies. The French army was never defeated in Algeria, but after eight years of fighting, de Gaulle quit.

Reagan saw nothing in Lebanon worth a war, and after the *New Jersey* shelled Lebanon in reprisal for the massacre our Marines, we went home. After eight years and 15,000 dead, the Russians gave up in Afghanistan.

Israel surrendered southern Lebanon after Hezbollah raised the price too high in blood. While the latest intifada was a disaster for the Palestinians, it was a victory for Hamas, whose fighting and dying displaced the PLO in the hearts of the people.

In set-piece battles, the Afghans could never have stood up to the Russian army, nor Hezbollah to the Marines, nor Hamas to an IDF that had routed Syrian,

Jordanian, and Egyptian armies in every conventional war they fought. But all persevered and all won.

How do the Americans win in Iraq? We are not like these other nations, we contend. Unlike Israel, we do not covet land Arabs call their own. Unlike the French and Russians, we are not an imperial power. Our fighting forces, Rumsfeld told the troops at Fort Irwin, “are engaging the terrorists over there where they live, so we don’t have to engage them over here.”

But prior to our invasion, no terrorist attack on U.S. interests involved any Iraqi, and not one suicide-bomb attack was traced to Saddam. Iraq is the central front in the War on Terror only because the U.S. invasion made it the central front.

As in Vietnam, the U.S. military can prevent any defeat in Iraq, but it cannot win the war unless it can annihilate this insurgency. And again, it cannot do that because, paradoxically, the U.S. military presence in Iraq is itself a cause and recruiting agent of the insurgency. The more of them we kill, the more we create.

When the Weimar government, facing runaway inflation in 1923, stopped paying its war debts and the German miners went on strike, the French army marched into the Ruhr. “You cannot dig coal with bayonets,” someone observed.

Digging coal is one of the occupations for which armies are not trained. Among the hidden perils of Iraq is that, as in Vietnam, the U.S. military will succeed in what it has been trained to do—winning battles—but fail at what not even the finest army is trained to do, creating a friendly nation out of an alien, indifferent, or often hostile population in an occupied land. ■

[divide and don't conquer]

Splitting Islam

A Shi'ite-Sunni strategy for surviving the War on Terror

By James Kurth

THE UNITED STATES now faces a widespread, long-term, and potentially catastrophic threat from Islamism, and the terrorist bombings since 9/11 indicate that this threat is becoming global in scope. Moreover, as the earlier U.S. struggle with communism, another hostile global ideology, suggests, the threat may persist for several generations. And as the accelerating spread of nuclear technology portends, the stakes of this threat may involve the nuclear destruction of one or more of America's great cities and perhaps even the very functioning of American society itself.

The current insurgency in Iraq, largely drawn from or supported by the Sunni population, is providing inspiration and training for Islamist insurgents elsewhere. Conversely, the global network of Islamist terrorists, which is also largely composed of extremist Sunnis, has been energized and legitimized by the insurgency in Iraq. The result is a global Islamist insurgency directed at the United States, its allies, and the West more generally. The folly of recent U.S. administrations, and most especially that of President George W. Bush, has placed us in this dangerous condition. But now that we are there, the central question is how can we get out?

Proposed solutions vary in a way that is familiar and predictable, that is, according to the different ideological

positions of their proponents, with the usual suspects being liberals, traditional conservatives, and neoconservatives.

Liberals are most numerous in public-policy discussions, and so the most common proposed solutions are theirs. They usually involve some sort of technical—really tactical—measure, such as improved intelligence, enhanced inspections in airports and seaports, and, recently, bag checks in subways and monitoring of fuel trucks. These measures do not require any changes in something as important as U.S. foreign policy or as fundamental as the presence in America of alienated and hostile immigrants from Muslim countries. Liberals commonly think that deep social and political conflicts can be solved by quick and superficial policies designed and implemented by sophisticated experts and officials (the liberals themselves). Of course, with Islamist terrorism a quick fix can always be outwaited by the terrorists, and a superficial one can always be outflanked by them.

Other proposed solutions seek to change American foreign policies that have so antagonized many Muslims, be it U.S. support of Israel and authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world or now military operations in Iraq. Such proposals for changing foreign policy are often put forward by traditional conservatives. They are also put forward by

career officials and professionals in foreign policy—especially those who are safely retired. Indeed, the Bush administration and the neoconservatives themselves have embraced the idea, although not the actual practice, that the United States should stop supporting dictators in the Muslim world. Of course, they are not about to change the other U.S. foreign policies at issue—support of Israel and military operations in Iraq.

Even if U.S. foreign policies were changed, however, the global Islamist insurgency very likely would continue. Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups would certainly take credit for driving the U.S. to abandon its course, and they would probably be encouraged and energized to go on to new and more radical objectives, such as eliminating any Western presence in the Muslim world while enhancing and expanding the Muslim presence in the West.

Of course, the solution offered by the Bush administration and the neoconservatives is, in its own way, also a radical one. They sought not just to change U.S. foreign policy, but to change the nature, or at least the culture, of the Middle East and the Muslim world more generally. They wanted to “drain the swamp” that sustained Islamist terrorists by bringing liberal democracy, free markets, open societies, and human rights to Muslim countries. Neoconservatives

claim that theirs is a universalist project. Most of the Muslim world views it, however, as merely another imperialist one like so many that they have seen in the past.

In any event, it is the neoconservative agenda that has propelled us into Iraq, adding fuel to the global Islamist insurgency while achieving virtually none of

success. In Europe in particular, the United States was very successful in separating moderate Marxists—socialists and social democrats—from extremist Marxists—communists—during the 1950s, and this division largely persisted for the rest of the Cold War. This splitting strategy was not very effective in the Third World, however. There, mod-

Kissinger in the early 1970s. Of course, the Sino-Soviet bloc had already been split by a serious conflict by the time the United States got around to recognizing and exploiting that momentous reality, but the Nixon administration did take advantage of it between 1971-73 in its efforts to bring about an end to the Vietnam War. Later administrations also made the Sino-Soviet split a major basis for their strategies toward the communist powers, and it was a major factor in the ultimate victory of the United States over the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

The contemporary analogy is the division between Sunnis and Shi'ites in the Islamic world. The ongoing sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iraq provides a daily reminder of the intensity of the division in that country, but the division, suspicion, and conflict between the two versions of Islam is a feature of many other Muslim countries as well, especially Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Sunnis normally regard Shi'ites as heretics and inferiors; Shi'ites normally regard Sunnis as hypocrites and oppressors.

Within the Muslim world as a whole, the Sunnis constitute a very large majority—about 83 percent; Shi'ites are 16 percent, with smaller sects providing the rest. Sunnis also make up the majority population in most Muslim states, but Shi'ites form a concentrated mass in a crucial expanse of the Muslim world, stretching from Lebanon through the Persian Gulf to Iran and even beyond. Shi'ites are a majority in Iran and Iraq and the largest single minority in Lebanon. They are also a majority in the vital, oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia.

In almost all Muslim states, the regime is comprised of persons who are, in some sense, identified as Sunnis. Among major Muslim states in recent years, only Iran has been ruled by a

THE HISTORY OF THE **COLD WAR SHOWS** THAT, WHEN DEALING WITH AN OPPOSING POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, A **STRATEGY OF SEPARATING ITS MODERATE ADHERENTS FROM ITS EXTREMIST ADHERENTS** CAN SOMETIMES BE **SUCCESSFUL**.

its proclaimed aims and driving the United States straight toward a giant debacle and failure.

Neither the liberal, the traditional conservative, nor the neoconservative solutions offer much hope for a way out of our dangerous condition *vis-à-vis* the global Islamist insurgency. The time has come to think about this threat in a new way—or perhaps in a way that is actually rather old—similar to the way that the United States dealt with the last global ideological threat, the international communist movement of half a century ago.

By analogy with strategies used by the United States against the global communist threat during the Cold War, we may be able to discern some possible strategies to divide and diminish the global Islamist threat of today. These splitting strategies are based upon different divisions that are found within the Muslim world, particularly (1) moderate Muslims versus extremist Islamists and (2) Sunni Muslims versus Shi'ite Muslims.

The history of the Cold War shows that, when dealing with an opposing political ideology, a strategy of separating its moderate adherents from its extremist adherents can sometimes be

erate Marxists—the “Third Way”—rarely existed or, if they did, they were soon marginalized by the extremist Marxists or repressed by the authoritarian, anticommunist regimes that were the allies of the United States.

Today's counterpart would be separating moderate Muslims from extremist Islamists. Once again, there are plausible reasons to think that a strategy of separating the moderates from the extremists might work in Europe, with its political democracies, developed economies, and open societies. European governments have many means available for striking bargains with moderate members of the Muslim communities residing in their nations, at the expense of the extremists. The prospects for a successful splitting strategy seem less promising in the Muslim countries of the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Southeast Asia. There, the features of authoritarian regimes, widespread poverty, and polarized societies combine to nurture extremist Islamism along with extremist political actions.

During the Cold War, the most consequential splitting strategy used by the United States was that directed at the Sino-Soviet bloc, which was initiated by Richard Nixon and Henry

Shi'ite regime, but of course the potential for Shi'ite rule is now a looming issue in Iraq. (The regime in Syria is dominated by Alewites, a sect that split off from Shi'ites.) Given Sunni demographic and political dominance in the Muslim world, it is not surprising that Shi'ites regard Sunnis as oppressors.

Extremists among the Sunnis dream of the restoration of the Islamic caliphate, which would rule by Islamic law the entire Muslim *umma*, or community, around the world. When the last Islamic caliphate, that of the Ottoman sultan, was abolished along with the Ottoman Empire in 1922, the Muslim world broke into a plethora of separate and competing states. These states and their apostate or heretical regimes would in turn be abolished with the establishment of the new caliphate. But since the Sunnis regard the Shi'ites as heretics, a true caliphate over the entire Muslim *umma* would have to do the right and just thing: subordinate and marginalize the Shi'ites as much as possible. Accordingly, the closer that the caliphate dream comes to being realized, the more the Shi'ites will have to resist the Sunni extremists. The project to restore the caliphate amounts, therefore, to an inherent fault line within the Islamist movement, a time bomb with the potential to blow it apart.


Iraq represents a test case and potential crucible for the Sunni-Shi'ite split. It is easy to imagine the current sectarian suspicion and violence in Iraq descending into an actual civil war between the Sunni and the Shi'ite communities—more accurately, between the Sunni Arabs and the Shi'ite Arabs, since the Sunni Kurds are trying to separate themselves from both Arab groups. What would the global Islamist movement look like then? It would have a rather different meaning and attraction than it does today. An Islamist identity might still appeal to some Muslims, but it

might well become less salient than the warring Sunni and Shi'ite identities. This would be even more likely to be the case if the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict in Iraq spread to its neighbors. Indeed, if the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict became not only intense and widespread but also prolonged, perhaps as much so as the Sino-Soviet conflict during the last three decades of the Cold War, the global Islamist movement might have almost no meaning or attraction at all. In the Muslim world there might be Sunni Islamists and Shi'ite Islamists, but each might consider their greatest enemy to be not the United States, but each other.

The Sunni Arabs of Iraq have always comprised a minority of that country's population (now about 15-20 percent). Because of their long history of oppres-


sion of the Shi'ite Arabs and the Sunni Kurds and because of their current support of the Islamist insurgency—an insurgency that includes Shi'ites and Kurds among its targets—the Sunni Arabs have much to answer for, and they have laid the groundwork for a terrible civil war.

Whatever the current public pronouncements of their leaders might be, the Sunni Arabs really want minority rule of Iraq by themselves. That is, they want an authoritarian system like that which served their interests under every regime since Iraq was created by the British, and indeed even before that under the Ottoman Empire. Since the Sunni Arab minority was in fact a rather small one, any regime composed by the Sunnis was especially authoritarian; the



“This collection is an indispensable guide to the most intellectually interesting and politically important debate in the U.S. on the war in Iraq.”

—ANATOL LIEVEN

 **CAMBRIDGE**
UNIVERSITY PRESS
www.cambridge.org/us

Sunni regime compensated for its especially small base by employing unusually brutal methods against the Shi'ite and Kurdish communities. As Iraqi society underwent progressive modernization in the course of the 20th century, the Shi'ites and the Kurds steadily acquired more of the economic and educational resources that enabled their political mobilization and organization. This largely explains why successive Sunni regimes had to become steadily more severe, leading to the brutal rule of the Ba'ath Party and culminating in the ferocious regime of Saddam Hussein. Only by increasing pressure from above could the regime keep down the pressure from below, the increasingly mobilized Shi'ites and Kurds.

Saddam Hussein's regime was often compared to the Soviet regime or the Nazi one. The outer organizational forms often followed a Soviet model, while the inner ideologist spirit had much in common with a Nazi mentality. In the latter comparison, Saddam Hussein was said to play the role of Hitler, the Ba'ath Party that of the Nazi Party, and the Iraqi people that of the German people. A more accurate comparison,

alternative—and certainly not any kind of democracy. They also knew that if their regime were to be overthrown and its elaborate security apparatus dismantled, total anarchy—indeed a Hobbesian state of war—very likely would ensue, and the long-suppressed Shi'ites and Kurds very likely would take their revenge.

From the Sunni perspective, it was bad enough when the United States destroyed Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003. Yet they still had a measure of protection left in what remained of the Iraqi army and the Ba'ath Party. But in May 2003, the head of the U.S. occupation authority, the imperious but incompetent Paul Bremer, decreed the abolition of both the army and the party, and he also authorized a deep purge of Ba'ath Party members from all Iraqi institutions, including the health services and the public utilities. Bremer's orders meant that several hundred thousand Sunnis were immediately thrown out of work.

The Sunnis were thus suddenly plunged into an economic condition equivalent to the Great Depression. Much worse, they saw themselves with

ized resistance to the U.S. occupation that they could find. This was soon provided by the underground elements that remained from the Ba'ath security apparatus and by the insurgent units that quickly grew out of Sunni Islamist organizations. It was not long before there was a fully developed insurgency in the notorious Sunni Triangle. And it was also not long before the Sunni insurgents began extensive and persistent attacks upon the Shi'ite population, which they now feared and which they had long despised.

The Bush administration persists in trying to construct—or conjure up—a democratic, unified Iraq, but this objective will probably prove to be unrealistic and unattainable. Instead, Iraq could well become an arena for a splitting strategy, and in any event for a splitting reality, with Sunnis versus Shi'ites and Kurdish militias versus Sunni terrorist groups. Shi'ite and Kurdish militias, if well trained and well armed by the United States, would be fully capable of destroying Sunni insurgents in the Shi'ite and Kurdish-populated areas of Iraq. (Indeed, even now many of the fledging units of the American-supervised "Iraqi" security forces are largely Shi'ite or Kurdish in composition. It would be natural enough for them to develop into units of a Shi'ite army and a Kurdish army.) The methods of these Shi'ite and Kurdish militias or armies would indeed be ruthless and would probably reach the point of expelling many of the Sunni inhabitants from the Shi'ite and Kurdish regions in a way reminiscent of ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia. The Sunni population might be reduced to a rump territory in central and western Iraq, along with sections of Baghdad and Mosul.

Even if the United States does not adopt a strategy of using Shi'ite and Kurdish militias to defeat the Sunni insurgents, the Shi'ites and Kurds, driven to

THE METHODS OF THESE SHI'ITE AND KURDISH MILITIAS WOULD BE RUTHLESS AND WOULD PROBABLY REACH THE POINT OF EXPELLING MANY OF THE SUNNI INHABITANTS IN A WAY REMINISCENT OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN YUGOSLAVIA.

however, would have been between the Ba'ath Party and the elite Nazi party unit, the S.S., and between the Sunni Arab community and the Nazi Party as a whole, which eventually comprised as much as 15 percent of the population of Nazi Germany.

By the late 1990s, the Sunnis were not merely the only beneficiaries of their authoritarian regime, they could not even imagine an acceptable political

the prospect of a massacre similar to others that have occurred in the Middle East, for example, the Armenian genocide of 1915-18, the Lebanese civil war of 1975-90, and of course the all-too-relevant Kurdish genocide implemented by Saddam Hussein in 1987-89. It should have been no surprise that the Sunnis would become desperate, even desperadoes, and that they would flee into any form of organ-

exasperation by Sunni support of the insurgent attacks upon their communities, may bring about this outcome through their own efforts alone. Iran is already providing aid to Shi'ite militias, and the Kurdish militia is already near the capability of an army. In the end, Iraq, like Yugoslavia, is likely to split into several hostile ethnic states. But the Islamist insurgency in the Shi'ite and Kurdish regions would have been eliminated.

It might seem obvious that an Iraqi civil war, or a war between separating Sunni, Shi'ite, and Kurdish states, would be bad for U.S. interests. At the very least, it would put the United States in a very difficult and embarrassing position. If, however, American military forces were no longer in Iraq, the major enemies of each Iraqi ethnic community or state would be each other. The United States would remain an enemy in the memory of many of the people living in Iraq, certainly the Sunnis, probably the Shi'ites, and potentially the Kurds (because the U.S. might have abandoned them once again), but for each ethnic community, the immediate and operational enemy would be the other communities now engaged in killing them.

The current insurgency against U.S. military forces in Iraq is doing much to increase the appeal and strength of Islamism and indeed of transnational networks of Islamic terrorists. In contrast, a war between the states in Iraq might do much to render Islamism irrelevant, at least in Iraq if not other countries of the Middle East. What meaning will Islamism have if Sunni Arab Muslims are killing Shi'ite Arab Muslims (along with Sunni Kurdish Muslims), and vice versa?

This kind of war could well drive the Sunni Arabs of Iraq into embracing the most extreme versions of Sunni Islam, Wahhabism or Salafism. But it could

also drive the Shi'ites and the Kurds to go on to invading the remaining Sunni areas, the Sunni Triangle and the Sunni districts of Baghdad and Mosul, in response. If a war between the states should expand and persist in Iraq, the Sunnis will be in grave danger of being ground to powder between the two millstones of the Shi'ites and the Kurds.

THE INSURGENCY IN IRAQ IS DOING MUCH TO INCREASE THE APPEAL OF ISLAMISM AND TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. A WAR BETWEEN THE STATES IN IRAQ MIGHT RENDER ISLAMISM IRRELEVANT.

In their current desperate state, the Sunnis seem to be heedless of this potential danger to their community and their very survival. Described in the past as the Prussians of the Arab world because of their high degree of organization, their ruthless methods, and their effective rule over other peoples within the state, the Sunnis are still too close to their recent ascendancy and invulnerability to imagine the catastrophe that could befall them. Even today, prominent Sunnis make the delusional claim that the Sunni Arabs comprise a majority in Iraq.

In any event, the Sunni Arabs think of themselves as the only truly warrior people, with an inherent right to rule the feckless and supine Shi'ites. They would do well, however, to recall what happened to the original Prussians in 1945, at the end of the Second World War. Three million died, 8 million had to flee their ancestral homeland forever, and the remaining 9 million were subjected by the Soviets to 40 years of communist rule in East Germany. Indeed, as a distinct people, the Prussians were never heard of again.

Any discussion of the Shi'ites must take into account Iran, which is by far the largest Shi'ite country and whose

Islamic regime has been hostile to the United States ever since 1979. As a result, the U.S. has long viewed the Shi'ite version of Islam as an even greater threat than the Sunni one, rather as the U.S. once (particularly in the 1960s) viewed the Chinese version of communism as an even greater threat than the Soviet one. The threat from Iran

is now greatly compounded by Iran's steady pursuit of nuclear-weapons capability—similar to China's nuclear pursuit in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which culminated in its successful nuclear test in 1964.

The Shi'ites of Iran, and indeed of any place else, continue to regard the United States with deep suspicion, resentment, and even contempt. They will never be true allies, but they could become co-belligerents with the United States against this or that extremist Sunni movement or state that is the enemy of them both. This is the case with al-Qaeda and its terrorist associates, and it could become the case if a radical Wahhabist or Salafist regime should take power in Saudi Arabia.

A nuclear Iran would not be the first Muslim nuclear state. Pakistan also has Islamist elements, and it already has its own nuclear weapons. In some ways, Iran and Pakistan are mirror images of each other. In Iran, the government is hostile to the United States, while the people are more friendly to it. Conversely, in Pakistan the government is often co-operative with the United States, while the people are often hostile to it. In addition, in Iran the large majority of the population is Shi'ite, but there

is a significant Sunni minority (about 10 percent). Conversely, in Pakistan the large majority of the population is Sunni, but there is a significant Shi'ite minority (about 15 percent).

The United States does not have any good strategic options with respect to these two dangerous Islamic bombs. Despite public bluster coming out of the Bush administration, there is no practical military operation by which the U.S. can completely and permanently destroy the Iranian nuclear-weapons program, and the military option is even less practical with respect to Pakistan. As for the splitting strategies, the first (moderates versus extremists) will probably not be effective with respect to either Iran's or

descends into an intense and prolonged civil war. This would likely accentuate and energize Sunni and Shi'ite identities and hostilities in Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Pakistan. A widespread Sunni-Shi'ite split could issue in a nuclear Iran and a nuclear Pakistan confronting each other in a very dangerous and destructive way. No reasonable U.S. foreign-policy professional would want to bring about this situation.

Nevertheless, whatever the United States does, there will eventually be an Iranian bomb neighboring a Pakistani bomb, just as there is now a Pakistani bomb neighboring an Indian one. There will, in other words, be three new and

When the United States got out of Vietnam, it had to abandon its project of maintaining noncommunist regimes in Indochina. Within a half decade, however, communist Vietnam, a Soviet ally, invaded communist Cambodia, a Chinese ally, and then communist China invaded communist Vietnam. With the United States out of the picture, the communist states naturally fell into fighting among themselves. The United States, under the Reagan administration, was able to take advantage of these and other conflicts within the communist world. Similarly, if the United States gets out of Iraq, it will have to abandon its delusional project of establishing democratic regimes in the Middle East. Within a short time, however, the central conflict within the Muslim world will be that between Sunnis and Shi'ites. It will be the fate of the Sunnis of Iraq, and in the longer run perhaps the fate of the Sunnis of Pakistan, that will wonderfully concentrate the Sunni mind. In that context, the current focus of Sunni Islamists upon the United States will appear misplaced and indeed mindless.

The United States should never have invaded Iraq in its vain effort to impose an external and alien development upon the Muslim world. The best course it can now take is to get out of Iraq and to allow the internal and natural contradictions within the Muslim world to take their course. The wise strategy of any truly great power in extending its influence to other countries is not to try to erect utterly new and bizarre constructions that have no foundation in the local realities. It is rather to try to turn to its own advantage those local realities and the inherent tensions within and between them. ■

James Kurth is the Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College, where he teaches American foreign policy, defense policy, and international politics.

THE U.S. DID NOT CREATE THE **SUNNI-SHI'ITE SPLIT IN ISLAMISM**, JUST AS IT DID NOT CREATE THE EARLIER **SINO-SOVIET SPLIT IN COMMUNISM**. IT CAN, HOWEVER, TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE DIVIDE AS IT DID DURING THE COLD WAR.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons. In both countries, the moderates and the extremists want their nations to be nuclear powers. The second splitting strategy (Sunnis versus Shi'ites) has potential, but for both good and ill. With Iran being mostly Shi'ite and Pakistan being mostly Sunni, in each country the majority engages in abusive practices against the minority, which is affiliated with the majority in the other country. This provides ample potential for conflict between Iran and Pakistan. In addition, the two countries share a contested border, which divides Baluchistan.

If both countries are nuclear powers, there will also be ample potential for nuclear threats and crises between them. The likelihood of conflict between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iran and Pakistan will be heightened if the conflict between Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iraq

unseasoned nuclear powers spaced out on a line in one of the most volatile and violent regions on the planet. As with most three-body problems, the dynamics of this three-bomb problem cannot now be predicted. But when these dynamics get underway, they are likely to overshadow and cast into the past many of the current obsessions of global Islamism. A nuclear and Sunni Pakistan, sandwiched in between a nuclear and Shi'ite Iran and a nuclear and Hindu India, might be in as grave a danger of being destroyed as the Sunnis of Iraq.

The United States did not create the Sunni-Shi'ite split in Islamism, just as it did not create the earlier Sino-Soviet split in communism. It can, however, put itself in a position to take advantage of the divide as it very likely will develop, as it did with the analogous split during the Cold War.

Vietnam Generation

Those who took sides in the '60s understand something the president doesn't.

By **Andrew J. Bacevich**

FOR ALL OF THE self-evident dissimilarities, Iraq is fast becoming Vietnam. As the ongoing war and the remembered war converge, here on the home front one effect is to divide male members of the baby-boom generation into two camps. Inhabitants of one camp differ on many things but have the satisfaction of occupying positions grounded in hard-won principle. Those in the other camp do not. Unfortunately, members of the second, consisting of those who ducked out of Vietnam, now govern the country and seem hell-bent on replicating the mistakes that made that war such a shipwreck.

Boomers famously opposed the Vietnam War. Members of the generation born in the immediate aftermath of World War II formed the rank and file of the most formidable antiwar movement in the nation's history. Despite their youth—or perhaps because of it—they provided much of that movement's leadership as well, John Kerry offering but one example. Indeed, more than any other single factor, opposition to the Vietnam War vaulted boomers into the position of political prominence that they have yet to surrender.

Today, many of those who in their college days had marched against Vietnam, now thicker around the middle and more likely to be drinking chardonnay than smoking dope, are speaking out in opposition to the war in Iraq. They do so for comparable reasons, seeing the present conflict as misbegotten, misguided, and morally wrong. To oppose such a

war is to keep faith with the ideals of their youth. Agree or disagree with their views, theirs is a consistent position by no means without honor.

Of course, boomers not only protested against the Vietnam War, they also fought it, in very large numbers. Draftees and volunteers alike, they constituted the rank and file of the Army that met with humiliating failure. These boomers in jungle fatigues did not conjure up the war nor did they have much say in how it was fought. They merely paid the price for the grotesque errors of the governing elite. Although the entire effort proved futile—or perhaps because of that fact—the Vietnam veteran eventually emerged as an iconic figure, imbued with a peculiar charisma and endowed with a special status and authority.

Whereas the Iraq War has re-energized antiwar boomers and reaffirmed their convictions, it has left boomer vets divided about what to do. All are adamant that the United States not repeat its mistakes in Vietnam. But they differ about which lessons are most germane and even more on their application to Iraq.

For some, the greatest mistake, perhaps the sole truly unforgivable one, was to betray those who fought there. For these vets, the implications are clear: in Iraq, we must forge on, permitting U.S. troops to win the victory that they were denied in Vietnam. Once in, there can be no second thoughts, no backpedaling, no holding back. To fight a war with anything less than an

absolute determination to win is criminal. Among boomer vets, Sen. John McCain stands as the most prominent and vigorous exponent of this view.

Other boomer vets prioritize the mistakes of Vietnam somewhat differently. The biggest problem, in their view, was not that policymakers bungled the conduct of the war—although they did—but that the war was unnecessary in the first place and probably unwinnable to boot. To commit to such an enterprise is folly; to persist in it year after year qualifies as madness.

For this contingent, too, the implications are clear: in Iraq, another unnecessary and perhaps unwinnable war, the time has come to cut our losses. Steely resolve makes a poor substitute for a coherent strategy. To insist that there exists no alternative but to slog on is to admit to intellectual bankruptcy. Although perhaps not fully subscribing to this position, Sen. Chuck Hagel qualifies as at least a fellow traveler.

Whether advocating a more vigorous prosecution of the Iraq War or favoring withdrawal, these boomer vets have earned their right to speak. Informed by an abiding empathy for those who bear the war's burdens, theirs too is a principled position.

Such differences of opinion notwithstanding, in one sense Iraq is reuniting those that Vietnam had seemingly divided forever. Those who fought the war and those who resisted it find that they share a common bond. Whichever side of the barricades they were on 30 or

40 years ago, those whose lives were changed by Vietnam insist that what happened then matters now. For members of this camp, the war's relevance is enduring and unquestionable.

Then there is the second camp. This group consists of boomers for whom Vietnam was a nonevent but who have now emerged as arch-advocates of the Iraq War. Unlike their contemporaries for whom Vietnam remains pivotal, members of this second group opted out of that war altogether. While millions of their fellow boomers loudly protested or dutifully served, they essentially went AWOL. They neither demonstrated nor fought. Instead, taking care to insulate themselves from the war's effects, they stayed on the sidelines. Employing means legal or illegal, they minimized their near-term risk while keeping open their options for the future. Like Vice President Cheney, they had "other priorities." Opportunism rather than principle determined their behavior.

President Bush is by no means the only member of this group, but it is his misfortune to embody it. Having connived to miss the war of his youth, the scion of the Bush clan had himself a rollicking good time in the 1960s and '70s, tapping his family's connections to get ahead. In middle age, he settled down and took over the family business. Now he orders the sons and daughters of his fellow baby boomers (although not his own) into a fight without foreseeable end.

As to Vietnam, Bush pretends that it never occurred—which in his case happens to be true. Similarly, the other boomers who even before 9/11 were lobbying for the U.S. to invade Iraq—most sporting military résumés even shorter than the president's—deny its relevance. With mantra-like insistence, senior Bush administration officials and war propagandists issue confident declarations that "Iraq is not Vietnam."

Yet to a remarkable extent Bush, the Vietnam no-show, seems determined to give the lie to that assertion. With the single exception of refraining from any hint of "meddling" in military operations, Commander in Chief Bush is all but modeling himself after the benighted Lyndon Baines Johnson.

Like Johnson in Vietnam, Bush in Iraq has wildly underestimated the enemy's capabilities and staying power. Like Johnson, he has backed into a protracted war of brutal half-measures and fancies that he can sustain such a war indefinitely without putting the nation on a war footing. Like Johnson, rather than confront the hard choices required either to prevail or to liquidate the American commitment, Bush is pursuing a course designed chiefly to postpone defeat. As did LBJ, this president lamely maintains the fiction of being in charge long after events have slipped out of his control. Even the highly publicized conclaves at Bush's Texas ranch—the president and his advisers making a great show of solemnly reviewing the war's progress—are a direct lift from the Johnson playbook. Perhaps worst of all, long after the strategic rationale for the entire war has been exposed as a sham, Bush like LBJ goes on pretending otherwise.

In the fall of 2005, Bush finds himself in a situation similar to Johnson's in the fall of 1967: the smart guys who got him into this mess have begun to bail out while those who remain have exhausted their fund of good ideas. An odor of desperation begins to envelop the White House. The president himself seems under siege—the "most powerful man in the world" hiding from critics and unable to venture out except for carefully scripted appearances.

Presidential leadership has been reduced to periodic bursts of exhortation. For a time, the events of September 11, 2001 conferred upon Bush the moral

authority of past wartime presidents like Lincoln or Roosevelt. Now, as ever larger numbers of Americans come to see Iraq not as necessary to prevent another 9/11 but as a pointless quagmire, Bush's exhortations ring hollow. Indeed, they produce an effect quite opposite from that intended: as with Johnson, prime-time assurances that all will come out well in the end actually undermine whatever support his policies still command. The undertone of exasperation increasingly evident in the president's delivery suggests that he may know this.

The fact is that when it comes to explaining this war as it converges with Vietnam, a president who skipped out of that earlier conflict has no credibility. Bush's fellow baby boomers might well listen respectfully to the views of someone who 40 years ago had the guts to go to jail over Vietnam. They might well elect as president someone who fought the war and came away the wiser—hence, the presidential hopes of McCain and Hagel. (They will not elect Kerry, who in equivocating about Iraq in 2004 squandered his own credibility.) But they will not listen to someone who during his generation's defining moment failed to turn up.

Whatever it was that duty summoned George W. Bush to do in the late 1960s and early '70s, he shirked it. He cannot now recover his lost honor or his moral authority by vowing to stay the course and summoning others to foot the bill. If there is a way out of Iraq, it is likely to be found in reviving, re-examining, and applying all that the United States learned at such great cost in Vietnam. But Bush wouldn't know that. After all, he wasn't even there. ■

Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University, is the author of The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War.

Unwelcome Prophet

Enoch Powell foresaw the perils of untrammelled multiculturalism.

Contemporary press accounts of Great Britain make for gloomy reading. It seems obvious that Britain will not manage to instill feelings of “Britishness” in its large, often disaffected population of young Muslims. It can’t simultaneously protect both the security of its own citizenry and the civil rights of its sizeable Muslim minority—most of which is perfectly law-abiding. British liberties are at risk and so are British lives, and given the nature of Great Britain and contemporary Islam, it seems a problem almost impossible to solve. These dilemmas exist in the United States as well, to a less pointed degree.

Britain’s problem was predictable and predicted. Enoch Powell, then a top figure in the Conservative Party, addressed it in a famous speech in April 1968. Within days, the British establishment moved against him, smearing him as a racist and fear-monger—an odd charge to raise against one of the men who spoke most forcefully against British army mistreatment of African prisoners during the Mau-Mau uprising.

As the British establishment closed him out and stripped Powell of his Conservative Party posts, there was huge public groundswell in his favor, and for years afterwards he was one of the most popular political figures in Britain. Some argue that had he been more tactically clever in his political career, Powell could have gained leadership of the Conservative Party after Edward Heath’s government fell in 1974.

He died seven years ago. His reputation is improving with each passing day.

Here we reprint an excerpt of the famous speech. It is striking for its blunt and searching insight into the perils a multicultural Britain would face while the country’s entire leadership class sedulously refused to consider them. The speech was, of course, not right in all its details or emphases, and Powell was not omniscient. We leave to our readers to ascertain whether such unvarnished talk about immigration would find a more welcome reception in the United States, or, as we suspect, even less of one.

What is certain is that this was one of the most important speeches given by a Western statesman in the 20th century, and the reaction to it—popular approval and elite horror—is symptomatic of a Western leadership crisis that reaches far beyond Great Britain in the 1960s and ’70s.

THE SUPREME FUNCTION of statesmanship is to provide against preventable evils. In seeking to do so, it encounters obstacles deeply rooted in human nature. One is that by the very order of things such evils are not demonstrable until they have occurred: at each stage in their onset there is room for doubt and for dispute whether they be real or imaginary. By the same token, they attract little attention in comparison with current troubles, which are both indisputable and pressing, whence the besetting temptation of all politics to concern itself with the immediate present at the expense of the future. Above all, people are disposed to mistake predicting troubles for causing troubles and even for

desiring troubles: “If only,” they love to think, “if only people wouldn’t talk about it, it probably wouldn’t happen.”

Perhaps this habit goes back to the primitive belief that the word and the thing, the name and the object, are identical. At all events, the discussion of future grave, but with effort now avoidable, evils is the most unpopular and the most necessary occupation for the politician.

Those who knowingly shirk it deserve, and not infrequently receive, the curses of those who come after. A week or two ago I fell into conversation with a constituent, a middle-aged, quite ordinary workingman employed in one of our nationalized industries. After a sentence or two about the weather, he suddenly said, “If I had the money to go, I wouldn’t stay in this country.” I made some deprecatory reply to the effect that even this government wouldn’t last forever, but he took no notice and continued: “I have three children, all of them through grammar school and two of them married now, with family. I shan’t be satisfied till I have seen them all settled overseas. In this country in 15 or 20 years’ time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man.”

I can already hear the chorus of execration. How dare I say such a horrible thing? How dare I stir up trouble and inflame feelings by repeating such a conversation? The answer is that I do not have the right not to do so. Here is a decent, ordinary fellow Englishman, who in broad daylight in my own town says to me, his Member of Parliament, that his country will not be worth living

in for his children. I simply do not have the right to shrug my shoulders and think about something else. What he is saying, thousands and hundreds of thousands are saying and thinking—not throughout Great Britain, perhaps, but in the areas that are already undergoing the total transformation to which there is no parallel in a thousand years of English history.

In 15 or 20 years, on present trends, there will be in this country three and a half million Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants. That is not my figure. That is the official figure given to Parliament by the spokesman of the Registrar General's Office. There is no comparable official figure for the year 2000, but it must be in the region of five to seven million, approximately one-tenth of the whole population, and approaching that of Greater London. Of course, it will not be evenly distributed from Margate to Aberystwyth and from Penzance to Aberdeen. Whole areas, towns, and parts of towns across England will be occupied by sections of the immigrant and immigrant-descended population.

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF AN **ALIEN ELEMENT INTRODUCED INTO A COUNTRY OR POPULATION** ARE PROFOUNDLY DIFFERENT ACCORDING TO WHETHER THAT ELEMENT IS **1 PERCENT OR 10 PERCENT.**

As time goes on, the proportion of this total who are immigrant descendants, those born in England, who arrived here by exactly the same route as the rest of us, will rapidly increase. Already by 1985 the native-born would constitute the majority. It is this fact that creates the extreme urgency of action now, of just that kind of action hardest for politicians to take, action where the difficulties lie in the present but the evils to be prevented or minimized lie several parliaments ahead.

The natural and rational first question with a nation confronted by such a prospect is to ask, "How can its dimensions be reduced?" Granted it be not wholly preventable, can it be limited, bearing in mind that numbers are of the essence: the significance and consequences of an alien element introduced into a country or population are profoundly different according to whether that element is 1 percent or 10 percent. The answers are simple and rational: by stopping, or virtually stopping, further inflow and by promoting the maximum outflow.

It almost passes belief that at this moment 20 or 30 additional immigrant children are arriving from overseas in Wolverhampton alone every week—and that means 15 or 20 additional families a decade or two hence. Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad. We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are, for the most part, the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is

like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre.

Let no one suppose that the flow of dependants will automatically tail off. On the contrary, even at the present admission rate of only 5,000 a year by voucher, there is sufficient for a further 25,000 dependants per annum ad infinitum, without taking into account the huge reservoir of existing relations in this country—and I am making no allowance at all for fraudulent entry. In these circumstances, nothing will suf-

fice but that the total inflow for settlement should be reduced at once to negligible proportions.

If all immigration ended tomorrow, the rate of growth of the immigrant and immigrant-descended population would be substantially reduced, but the prospective size of this element in the population would still leave the basic character of the national danger unaffected. This can only be tackled while a considerable proportion of the total still comprises persons who entered this country during the last 10 years or so. Hence the urgency of the encouragement of re-emigration. Nobody can make an estimate of the numbers which, with generous assistance, would choose either to return to their countries of origin or to go to other countries anxious to receive the manpower and the skills they represent. Nobody knows, because no such policy has yet been attempted. I can only say that, even at present, immigrants in my own constituency from time to time come to me, asking if I can find them assistance to return home. If such a policy were adopted and pursued with the determination the gravity of the alternative justifies, the resultant outflow could appreciably alter the prospects.

All who are in this country as citizens should be equal before the law and there shall be no discrimination or difference made between them by public authority. This does not mean that the immigrant and his descendent should be elevated into a privileged or special class or that the citizen should be denied his right to discriminate in the management of his own affairs between one fellow-citizen and another or that he should be subjected to imposition as to his reasons and motive for behaving in one lawful manner rather than another.

Nothing is more misleading than comparison between the Commonwealth immigrant in Britain and the American

Negro. The Negro population of the United States, which was already in existence before the United States became a nation, started as slaves and were later given the franchise and other rights of citizenship, to the exercise of which they have only gradually and still incompletely come. The Commonwealth immigrant came to Britain as a full citizen, to a country which knew no discrimination between one citizen and another, and he entered instantly into the possession of the rights of every citizen, from the vote to free treatment under the National Health Service. Whatever drawbacks attended the immigrants arose not from the law or from public policy or from administration but from those personal circumstances and accidents which cause, and always will cause, the fortunes and experience of one man to be different from another's.

While to the immigrant entry to this country was admission to privileges and opportunities eagerly sought, the impact upon the existing population was very different. They found themselves made strangers in their own country. They found their wives unable to obtain hospital beds in childbirth, their children unable to obtain school places, their homes and neighborhoods changed beyond recognition, their plans and prospects for the future defeated; at work they found that employers hesitated to apply to the immigrant worker the standards of discipline and competence required of the native-born worker; they began to hear, as time went by, more and more voices that told them that they were now the unwanted.

In the hundreds upon hundreds of letters I received when I last spoke on this subject, there was one striking feature which was largely new and which I find ominous. All Members of Parliament are used to the typical anonymous corre-

spondent; but what surprised and alarmed me was the high proportion of ordinary, decent, sensible people, writing a rational and often well-educated letter, who believed that they had to omit their address because it was dangerous to have committed themselves to paper agreeing with the views I had expressed, and they would risk penalties or reprisals if they were known to have done so. The sense of being a persecuted minority, which is growing among ordinary English people, is something that those without direct experience can hardly imagine.

The other dangerous delusion from which those who are willfully or otherwise blind to realities suffer is summed up in the word "integration." To be integrated into a population means to become for all practical purposes indistinguishable from its other members. Now, at all times, where there are marked physical differences, especially of color, integration is difficult though, over a period, not impossible. There are among the Commonwealth immigrants who have come to live here in the last 15 years, many thousands whose wish and purpose is to be integrated and whose every thought and endeavor is bent in that direction. But to imagine that such a thing enters the heads of a great and growing majority of immigrants and their descendants is a ludicrous misconception, and a dangerous one.

We are on the verge of a change. Hitherto it has been force of circumstance and of background which has rendered the very idea of integration inaccessible to the greater part of the immigrant population—they never conceived or intended such a thing, and their numbers and physical concentration meant the pressures towards integration which normally bear upon any small minority did not operate. Now we are seeing the growth of positive forces acting against integration, of vested interests in the

preservation and sharpening of racial and religious differences with a view to the exercise of actual domination, first over fellow immigrants and then over the rest of the population.

The cloud no bigger than a man's hand that can so rapidly overcast the sky has been visible recently in Wolverhampton and has shown signs of spreading quickly. The words I am about to use, verbatim as they appeared in the local press on 17 February, are not mine, but those of a Labour Member of Parliament who is a minister in the present government:

The Sikh communities' campaign to maintain customs inappropriate in Britain is much to be regretted. Working in Britain, particularly in the public services, they should be prepared to accept the terms and conditions of their employment. To claim special communal rights (or should one say rites?) leads to a dangerous fragmentation within society. This communalism is a canker; whether practiced by one color or another it is to be strongly condemned.

As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, I seem to see "the River Tiber foaming with much blood." That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come. In numerical terms, it will be of American proportions long before the end of the century. Only resolute and urgent action will avert it even now. Whether there will be the public will to demand and obtain that action, I do not know. All I know is that to see, and not to speak, would be the great betrayal. ■

Aren't We Fooling Ourselves?

This Article Is Frightening, Where Are Our Leaders, Can't They See This?

Glowing Government Misleading Statistics Mask The True Condition Of Our Economy

Economists claim US gross domestic product (GDP) growth is a sign of our economic strength. This is an anachronistic statistic developed after WWII when all consumer purchases were produced in America. **This has now dramatically changed, but is not accurately reflected in this obsolete, but still used bullish statistic.**

Since 70% of GDP is consumer spending and much of what is purchased is now made by foreign owned companies. The faster GDP grows, the more money we lose overseas – the better we think we are doing, the worse off we actually are. This trend has been growing unabated for the past 30 years, **and we now fund foreign coffers with an unprecedented \$1.25 Million per minute** - (approximately \$617 Billion in 2004) heading to \$700 Billion in 2005 – by importing 25% of all manufactured goods consumed in this country and exporting a much smaller amount than we import.

These losses return not to buy US made goods or services, but to buy title to our irreplaceable strategic wealth producing assets (our future means of generating wealth) at a rate of approximately \$1.8 Billion per day. GDP growth averaging 4% over the past decade pails in comparison to the US losses due to importing more than we export, which are growing at 25% per year over the same period. **No other country in history has ever suffered such losses without economically collapsing.**

Our Present Standard Of Living Has Lulled Us Into Feeling No Urgency For Change

Hence most Americans do not consider how vulnerable our economy really is, much like the attitude towards terrorism before September 11th. We are not living on current production, but accumulated wealth generated after World War II in 1945, surviving unscathed while the rest of the world was devastated in that war. Our future will be in jeopardy once we have no more wealth producing assets to sell. The economic strength heralded by misleading GDP growth statistics belies the extreme cost of living so well while producing so little.

Many Of Our Companies Are "Cashing Out" To The Detriment Of Our Country

In the past 10 years, foreign countries have made strategic acquisitions, loans, or investments totaling 4x the foreign investment of the 1980's, a period during which much alarm was raised over the "sellout of America!" 40% of this foreign investment was funded by our own money through US losses due to importing more than we export, according to the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. This "cashing out" is not being reinvested in more productive endeavors as evidenced by the ever-increasing dependency on foreign goods and services. It is being recycled to consumer goods.

All of our wealth producing assets are available for sale on the open stock market – and many of our most valuable ones have already been sold.

In the past 10 years, foreign interests acquired \$3.2 Trillion of US corporate securities including 8,600 strategic takeovers in areas like energy (\$116 Billion), transportation equipment (\$54 Billion), telecommunications (\$146 Billion), printing & publishing (\$56 Billion), insurance (\$85 Billion), electronics (\$61 Billion), and pharmaceuticals (\$60 Billion).

The result is that many of our industries are now largely foreign owned according to the IRS (e.g. plastics / rubber: 47%, financial svcs: 36%, machinery: 32%, chemicals: 30%, transportation equipment: 27%, publishing: 21%, cement: 81%, motion pictures: 69%, consumer television / electronics: nearly 100%...).

We Are Now Vulnerable For Easy Economic Takeovers

To illustrate our extreme vulnerability, General Motors could be theoretically 100% acquired for less than 2% of the \$1 Trillion US currency held by Japan – and GM, presently capitalized with a value of \$20 Billion, is available for sale now on the open market. At this price GM could be cheaply bought for nothing more than the cost for use as spare parts by the acquiring company, with devastating impact on the US economy.

Hundreds of acquisitions as strategic as General Motors have already occurred. In the past 17 years, the US government has reviewed 1,500 of the thousands of foreign takeovers and rejected only 1. These are not frivolous "dot-com" acquisitions – each one, a

Learn how to help raise awareness at: www.EconomyInCrisis.org

strategic industrial chokepoint, a key component of our economy. **Other countries forbid foreign control of major industrial assets – why are we not doing the same?**

In reality, Japan would not need to acquire General Motors to destroy the automaker. Our policies are presently permitting foreign automakers to put GM out of business by allowing the sale of subsidized and market-protected foreign vehicles directly to Americans at a fraction of the cost of American manufacturing – with foreign profits and taxes leaving the US, directed to foreign research and development and future acquisition of US assets.

We Are Longer Innovative Nor Competitive

We are no longer competitive: 22.4% cost **disadvantage** for American producers versus foreign competitors according to National Association of Manufacturers.

We are no longer innovating: foreign corporate research and development is now nearly twice that of US corporate R&D according to MIT – 3x more foreign corporate R&D in automotive, 2.5x in heavy industry, 2x in energy, 12x in electronics, 3x in chemicals, and 1.5x in aerospace.

We are no longer oriented towards advanced technology: US now 17th in the world in number of trained new scientists (down from 3rd only three decades ago) according to the National Science Board.

We are losing a grip on ingenuity: US world share of new patents has fallen 15% since 1980 while Japan has nearly doubled during that period according to the National Science Foundation.

We are disarming industrially: 4 Million manufacturing jobs have been lost in the past 10 years while many of our industries now require offshore manufacturing to struggle to survive against foreign competitors.

We Are Dependent On Foreign Loans To Run our Government

Foreign countries also used part of their US trade deficit proceeds to loan the US Government \$1.5 Trillion over the past 10 years. According to the US Treasury Department, In 2004, **99% of the US Federal Deficit was financed by foreign loans**, up from 70% in 2003. Our global competitors are now our bankers, loaning us money for our tax cuts and our global wars. How can we effectively negotiate with those who hold our debt and finance our government? We are always forced to negotiate from a very weak position.

We Are Losing Our Key Manufacturing Companies That Are Needed To Produce What We Consume

While our net wealth statistic deceptively appears to be growing, much of this is due to “cashing out” of existing inherited wealth producing assets. We are not replacing these assets fast enough to offset the losses through acquisition and predatory foreign competition. The proof is that while GDP has been growing around 4% per year over the past 10 years, **the trade deficit is growing at 25% per year over the same period.** We are losing more and more of the assets we need to produce what we consume.

We Are Losing An Economics War

In a military war, the ammunition is bullets. In an economic war which has been methodically waged against us by foreign countries, **the weapon is foreign**

currency reserves used to buy our industries (\$3.2 Trillion foreign acquisition of US corporate securities in past 10 years), lobby our politicians (47% of US Trade Representatives were later hired by foreign interests in the 1980's), influence our media (69% of our motion picture industry is foreign owned), and bind our government (99% of our US Federal Deficit was financed by foreign interests in 2004).

We Have Economically Lost Control Of Our Country

Japan now holds US dollar reserves of \$1.0 Trillion, China has \$600 Billion, and South Korea about \$200 Billion. **We have no plan to address our vulnerable condition and mistakenly use measures like GDP to delude ourselves.**

How can we continue to spend as we are with much less industry to produce wealth, no ability to compete, and with all of our assets available for sale on the open market? The trend for the past 30 years has been unwavering and accelerating.

With no change, we have, for all intents and purposes, already lost control of our country. With control of much of our wealth producing assets in the hands of foreign takeover companies, we will soon become subjugated to work for the benefits and at the direction of them, much to a similar extent as if we were retaken by a colonial power.

If present trends continue unchecked, we will face conditions we never could have imagined and our future will certainly be nothing like our past.

Send this to your friends, or as a letter to your local newspaper editor, and to your Congressperson.

ECONOMY IN CRISIS

CREATING AWARENESS OF OUR TRUE ECONOMIC CONDITION

From Minutemen to Mainstream

In order to succeed, restrictionists must say racists are not welcome.

By Scott McConnell

AFTER BEING CONTAINED for nearly a decade, immigration reform has been breaking its tethers: a new wave of grassroots activists and a serious congressional faction is putting the issue back on the American political agenda. Fed up with the Bush administration's disinterest in securing the country's borders, local elected officials are also stepping into the breach. The Minuteman Project—which mobilized volunteers in a well-publicized effort to help patrol the Mexico-Arizona border earlier this year—now has affiliates in 18 states and has attracted favorable press coverage and public notice. In New Hampshire, a local police chief is trying to employ criminal-trespass statutes against illegal aliens. In Texas, a county commissioner is using federal anti-corruption statutes against employers who hire illegals.

In the early 1990s, when immigration was last on the national agenda, it was a hot grassroots issue only in California, home of Proposition 187. Now, with large numbers of illegal aliens visible throughout the country and post-9/11 security worries, local concern is widespread. The elite press—liberal and neoconservative alike—sneers at “beer swilling good ol’ boys” who want to monitor the border, but the fact is that the long simmering sentiment of Americans desirous of border enforcement and lower rates of immigration may be ready to take shape as an unstoppable bipartisan majority.

But note the cautious “may.” Recall that in the early 1990s, immigration reform seemed like an issue whose time had come. But first some bad luck interfered—California Gov. Pete Wilson's ill-

ness at the outset of his 1996 presidential campaign and Barbara Jordan's sudden death just as her Clinton-appointed commission's report was completed. (The group chaired by the eloquent Democratic congresswoman had recommended more effective interior enforcement against illegal aliens and a reduction in legal immigration.) In the meantime, the opposition rallied: the cheap-labor business lobbies forged a viable coalition with leftwing multicultural forces. They mobilized against immigration reform and killed it: in early 1996, serious immigration-reform legislation came up some 40 votes short in Congress, and that was the end of it.

The United States is different now. There are more immigrants and children of immigrants of every stripe. However much estimates of the Hispanic vote are swollen by the Beltway pundits, that vote is larger than it used to be—and growing. There is much truth to Nathan Glazer's assertion—first published seven years ago—that “We are All Multiculturalists Now.” The Euro-America that existed until roughly 1980 has passed into history. If the immigration-reform movement is not to squander its second (and likely its last) opportunity, it must learn to accommodate itself to those changes.

An obscure incident in Laguna Beach, California illuminates the movement's most dangerous trap. In mid-July, a hundred protesters marched to decry city funding of a day-labor site for illegal workers. Among the participants were members of Save Our State, an immigration-reform group involved in the Proposition 187 campaign, and James Gilchrist,

one of the principals of the Minuteman Project—both groups roughly representative of grassroots immigration reform. They waved American flags and carried posters calling for the deportation of illegal aliens. A dozen lefty counter-protesters challenged them, labeling the demonstrators racist nuts.

And then a half-dozen extremists—people who actually are racist nuts—made an appearance, unfurling Confederate battle flags and in one instance a Nazi swastika. It's not clear what happened then, but any hope immigration reformers had of making a favorable impression on viewers of the local news immediately vanished.

The Minutemen make clear in their literature, public statements, and website that they want nothing to do with racists or white nationalists, and there is no reason to doubt their sincerity. But the Laguna Beach fiasco demonstrates that such policies don't go far enough. It is the nature of politically marginal groups to seek to attach themselves to more broad-based social movements—and they won't be deterred by polite requests that they stay away. The Left's history is replete with various Communist groups trying to gain influence in the labor movement, the civil-rights movement, and the antiwar movement. Indeed, the hard Left actually possessed cadres with considerable organizational skills that could make themselves useful in ways that the average skinhead with a swastika cannot.

In the early years of the Cold War, the American labor movement addressed the problem by purging Communists (includ-

ing many skilled organizers) from its ranks. Such a purge no doubt went against the grain of many union types, but it was a necessary prelude to the golden age of the American labor movement in which tens of millions of workers and their families were able to acquire the trappings of a middle-class life.

There's an old joke about the Republican Party and its dismal but perhaps slightly improving electoral relationship with black Americans. Question: what do you call the black man you run into at the Republican convention? Answer: Mr. Keynote Speaker. The joke bespeaks a cynicism about Republican minority-outreach policies that can easily be overstated. There is no more real racism in the GOP ranks than among white Democrats and roughly equivalent concerns about safety, school quality, and other topics that often have racial aspects to them. But—mirroring the Democrats—the GOP has adopted minority outreach big time, and it has largely overcome the image it had 15 or 20 years ago as a party built around white backlash and the Southern strategy. That image has faded—without, it might be noted, costing the GOP its hold on the South.

If the immigration-reform movement is to succeed, it needs to achieve something similar. If its foes can routinely and successfully depict immigration reform as racist and anti-immigrant, it will fail. The movement needs to create an aura around itself that is attractive to first- and second-generation immigrants, and—just as important—that would be repellant to the kind of white nationalists who want to attach themselves to it for their own purposes.

In theory this is simple enough: the most sensible immigration-reform line—most consistently embodied by the Washington-based Center for Immigration Studies—is pro-immigrant and pro-reform. In essence, the argument is that the United States could better welcome

and assimilate new immigrants if their rate of entry were reduced.

Unlike many tactical political arguments, this one has the added benefit of being true. The greatest barrier to higher wages and more economic security for the millions of immigrants working in low-wage jobs is the great reserve army of future illegal aliens ready to work for even lower wages. The Bush administration and the neoconservatives insist, falsely, that these cannot be kept out.

The more poor immigrants there are, the more difficult for American schools to improve the skills of their children. The greatest barrier to real assimilation is the persistence of expanding communities in which English is a second language, barely spoken at all.

The only people whose interests would be harmed by a slowdown in immigration are not the immigrants already here—they would clearly benefit—but the ethnic activists who purport to speak for them and the employers who want a large, desperate pool of workers willing to toil for sub-American wage rates.

Many in the immigration-reform movement understand this, but it's not clear they know it well enough. For example, Save Our State founder Joseph Turner recently sought to present his case to Los Angeles's black community by soliciting an invitation to speak before Earl Ofari Hutchinson's Urban Policy Roundtable, a popular political forum. Hearing of his scheduled talk, open-borders forces mobilized against the appearance, labeling Save our State violent, hateful, and racist. The smear was false, of course. But Hutchinson said he was troubled by rhetoric on the SOS website asking whether Californians wanted their state to turn into a "Third World cesspool." He eventually rescinded the invitation.

A case could be made that such language isn't racist, but it is not likely to be persuasive to many potential allies of the immigration-reform movement. And if

immigration reformers need such allies to prevail, they need to hear how their own rhetoric sounds in the ears of others. Earl Ofari Hutchinson later told the *Los Angeles Times* that at every forum he sponsors, someone raises the issue of illegal immigration and that if Turner had come, "he would be met with thunderous applause." But he never had the opportunity. For his part, Turner at least seems to understand the problem. "Rightly or wrongly we're seen as being a bunch of angry white guys. ... Our movement needs to enlarge the tent."

Multicultural outreach is now an American cliché with its own set rituals, and the immigration-reform movement needs to start adopting them. It certainly must deal effectively with its own infiltrators—if it isn't practical to bar neo-Nazis from its public events, it can certainly make itself repellant to them. Beyond that, it can and should engage in symbolic affirmative-action frippery that mainstream political groups in the United States adopt as a matter of course. It can acknowledge—loudly and without hesitation—that the United States has benefited from immigration in the past and will continue to do so in the future. It can proclaim that the country could do a better job at welcoming new immigrants if it took them in at rates at which they could be assimilated, economically and culturally. It can look harder for potential allies in the Hispanic community and ensure that their voices are amplified. (It won't be difficult: the legendary farm labor leader Cesar Chavez, after all, was no fan of illegal immigrants, for sound economic reasons.) And, of course—as in the overwhelming majority of cases it does—the reform movement should shun racist appeals and associations, which will always harm more than help.

If immigration reformers can't figure out how to do these things in the next few years, they won't have another chance. ■

Casualties of Waugh

The finest novelist of the last century was also a masterful polemicist.

By R. J. Stove

EVELYN WAUGH died in 1966 and spent most of his last two decades wishing he had died in 1946—or better still in 1446. His numerous latter-day foes shared this wish, often risking the full might of British libel laws in their zest for mocking him. Scottish journalist George Malcolm Thomson compared Waugh to “an indignant White Leghorn” and charged one of Waugh’s ancestors—on no evidence—with having left the Presbyterian church in protest against its abandonment of witch-burning. The late Hugh Trevor-Roper, now far better remembered as preposterous dupe (especially apropos the “Hitler” diaries) than for the historian’s role in which he fancied himself, was driven to new heights of sectarian cackling by Waugh’s creed: “Follow me, says Mr. Evelyn Waugh, for in the intellectual emptiness of modern English Catholicism only the snob-appeal is left.”

High-octane invective continued when Waugh could no longer fight back. An anonymous *Time* correspondent chose to summarize him as “a flabby old Blimp with brandy jowls and a menacing pewter complexion,” these traits being presumably considered adequate reasons for ignoring Waugh’s actual work. In 1982, Kingsley Amis—having several times winced under the birchings of Waugh as reviewer—retributively subjected Waugh’s most lush and baroque novel, *Brideshead Revisited*, to a triumph of silly-clever debating-society rhetoric predictable from its name alone: “How I Lived In A Very Big House And Found God.” (Previously Malcolm Muggeridge had dismissed the same book—

which he never finished reading—as “tedious and rather foolish.”) And thence to one Jonathan Raban, who in his 1987 volume *For Love and Money* sniffed that Waugh, save for his novelistic skill, “might have been most happily employed in the writing of pamphlets for the Catholic Truth Society.” (So there.)

Even those who venerated Waugh often misconstrued him. Frances Donaldson, his neighbor and friendly enemy, lamented, “Often his jokes fell by the wayside, were not recognized as jokes.” A polite, if clueless, female newspaper interviewer from Stockholm told him, “Mr. Wog, you are a great satyr.” “I assure you not,” Waugh replied. Imperturbable, the Swede droned on, “My editor says you have satirized the English nobility.” (The interview’s dadaist tone, exemplified here, culminated in its eventual headline: “Huxley’s Ape Makes Hobby of Graveyards.”)

True, Waugh could famously dish the dirt in return. London’s literary Mafiosi—who, to the limited extent that Catholicism had come to their attention at all, associated it with Chesterton’s constant benevolence—quickly learned to quail at Waugh’s excoriating Catholic tongue. He denounced Britain’s 1945-1951 government as “the Cripps-Attlee terror.” In public he indicted the entire American people for bearing an extra dose of original sin: “treason to the British crown.” Edmund Wilson, whose *Memoirs of Hecate County* had been considered too salacious for British release—thereby feeding Wilson’s fantasies of himself as a pure Whitmanesque martyr assailed by dirty-minded Tory philistines—never for-

gave Waugh for his unsolicited counsel: “Mr. Wilson, in cases like yours I suggest publication in Cairo.” He famously greeted the removal of Randolph Churchill’s non-malignant tumor with the verdict: “It was a typical triumph of modern science to find the only part of Randolph that was not malignant and remove it.” And he scattered Trevor-Roper’s pretensions with a *New Statesman* outburst: “On the rather frequent occasions when he tries to make fun of our religion, he sets us the amusing weekend competition of spotting the first howler. We seldom have to read far.” Late in life, during the Second Vatican Council’s alleged golden dawn, Waugh received an invitation to a book launch by self-consciously “progressive” Catholics. He shot back by postcard his unforgettable RSVP: while he would not attend a social meal in the progressives’ company, “I would gladly attend an auto da fé at which your guests were incinerated.”

Abundant as Waugh’s output is in such pleasures as these, it seems ludicrous that whereas Waugh’s novels (especially the prewar ones) fascinate movie directors and appear to have provoked analysis from every critic and his dog, Waugh’s nonfiction remains an underrated treasure. He despised it himself, or rather, affected to despise it, scorning his collected journalism as “bestly little articles.” And if you believe that—to quote the Duke of Wellington—you will believe anything.

* * *

Born in 1903, raised in the Church of England, and a Catholic from 1930,

Waugh produced (discounting forgettable juvenilia) his first essays in 1928, his last in 1965. Editors on both sides of the Atlantic—particularly at *Life*, *Esquire*, and *National Review* in the States, *The Spectator* and *The Tablet* in Britain—ran his commentaries with relish; unlike certain more pretentious sages, he demonstrated the humdrum virtue of submitting prompt and accurate copy. (For *The Tablet* he wrote unpaid, so greatly did he esteem its then role as guardian of Catholic doctrine.)

Since the Australian academic Donat Gallagher compiled in 1983 a breathtaking 662-page compendium of Waugh's occasional prose, there goes our last excuse for not exploring it.

Among the several Waughs whom Dr. Gallagher reveals—the Enforcer, the Theologian, the Connoisseur, the Unpackaged Tourist—the first is the best known. The joys of Waugh employing all his (self-acquired) erudition to smack around a witless foe are blatant enough but cherishable for all that. He polished off Stephen Spender—who by virtue of dilettante Marxism and homosexual cruising had acquired a brief, specious reputation for poetic talent—in a single deadly clause: “to see him fumbling with our rich and delicate language is to experience all the horror of seeing a Sèvres vase in the hands of a chimpanzee.” Most writers would have been content with that one *coup de grâce*, but in the same article Waugh keeps kicking and kicking at the literary cadaver before him. After quoting with approval T.S. Eliot's gentle rebuke of Spender (“I can understand your wanting to write poems. But I don't know what you mean by ‘being a poet’”), Waugh snarls:

Mr. Spender knew very well. He meant going to literary luncheons, addressing youth rallies and summer schools, saluting the great

and ‘discovering’ the young, adding his name to letters to *The Times*, flitting about the world to cultural congresses. All the penalties of eminence which real writers shirk Mr. Spender pays with enthusiasm.

In 1935, Waugh had drubbed a bungling biographer of the pre-Raphaelites, who through her sheer incompetence—her many solecisms included confusing Giovanni Bellini the painter with Vincenzo Bellini the composer—goaded Waugh to the following conclusion:

All these faults occur in the first eight and a half pages ... On the wrapper of the book it is prominently announced that Miss Winwar has been awarded a £1,000 prize, and that this shocking work was selected from over 800 manuscripts. It is not revealed by whom the prize was offered or who made the selection. Perhaps the name was drawn out of a hat. But if, as it is reasonable to assume, this book was chosen for its superior merit, the mind reels at the thought of the unsuccessful 800.

A subtler demolition job occurs in the spiritual slum-clearance to which Cyril “Palinurus” Connolly's postwar manifesto inspired Waugh. For years Waugh had combined admiration for Connolly's style—“phrase after phrase of lapidary form”—with valid aversion to what passed for Connolly's thought: a mishmash of Freud, Spanish Republican bravado, self-justifying priapism, and physical cowardice. (While the unformed Waugh faced the Germans in Crete, Connolly was diving under his mistress's bed at the air-raid siren, proclaiming, “Perfect fear casteth out love.”) Once Cyril hung out his shingle as philosopher-king, Waugh sent the wrecker's ball hurtling through space:

The significant feature of the Palinurus plan is that none of it makes any sense at all. It has been a hobby among literary men for centuries to describe ideal, theoretical states. There have been numberless ingenious contrivances, some so coherent that it seemed only pure mischance which made them remain mere works of reason and imagination without concrete form. It has been Palinurus's achievement to produce a plan so full of internal contradictions that it epitomizes the confusion of all his contemporaries. This plan is not the babbling of a secondary-school girl at a youth rally but the written words of the mature and respected leader of the English intellectuals.

Waugh the Theologian offers numerous surprises, including a lack of empathy for the three major Catholic writers (two of them foreign-born) active in his England. Chesterton he censured for carelessness, though *Brideshead* alludes poignantly to a Father Brown tale, “The Queer Feet.” Belloc's historiography, as distinct from Belloc's verse, he dismissed *en bloc* (“banging about of ideas and a few facts”). “How much was Chesterton,” Waugh wondered, “how much Belloc, driven by financial need to the overproduction which oppressed them ...? How much was it the product of a nervous restlessness and sloth? For profusion can be slothful.” As for Roy Campbell, Waugh seems never to have shown him the slightest interest, even before their ways irrevocably parted regarding Franco, at whom Waugh liverishly sniped in one of his weakest stories, “Scott-King's Modern Europe.” (A provincial streak did mar his ultramontane mind. Upon the occasional mischievous whim, he could and did behave when abroad like the crassest possible lout.) Of Waugh's few encounters with Catholic intellectuals in Europe,

his awkward meeting with Paul Claudel may stand for the rest: "He lacks," Claudel complained afterwards, "the allure of the true gentleman."

In his friendships, Waugh sought, above all, singularity and literacy. Almost anyone with those characteristics could warm Waugh's heart; a Catholic without them could seldom if ever arouse his interest. To most of his co-religionists Waugh much preferred—on both personal and literary grounds—Orwell the stoic, Nancy Mitford the deist, Anthony Powell the tepid Anglican, and Graham Greene the sordid pagan who raided Catholicism's dress-up box. Even casual intruders occasionally benefited from a charm with which few credited him. James Kirkup, poet and incorrigible pederast, once decided when on a stroll to pick flowers from a hedge. As soon as he did so, a curmudgeonly voice roared forth: "What the bloody hell do you think you're doing? That's my hedge!" Suddenly there loomed before Kirkup's eyes Waugh's face, empurpled in its ire. The panicky Kirkup ("I felt my knees turn to water") responded by blurting out the first lines that came to him, from Wordsworth's "A Poet's Epitaph." Waugh's emollient answer: "I see you are a man of letters. It's nearly lunchtime. Come and have a sherry." "Once one got to know [Waugh]," Kirkup recollected, "no one could be nicer."

* * *

Many an English scribe thinks he understands the U.S. after three days being chauffeured around Manhattan and five days pampered in Hollywood. The rest of the Republic is to him—as "The Simpsons" once put it—"that useless piece of land between New York and Los Angeles. You know, America." Waugh actually visited, and stayed in, what he died too soon to call "flyover country." Note the concision with which he captures Louisiana after Mardi Gras:

There is witchcraft in New Orleans, as there was at the court of Mme. de Montespan. Yet it was there that I saw one of the most moving sights of my tour. Ash Wednesday; warm rain falling in streets unsightly with the draggled survivals of carnival. The Roosevelt Hotel overflowing with crapulous tourists planning their return journeys. How many of them knew anything about Lent? But across the way the Jesuit Church was teeming with life all day long; a continuous, dense crowd of all colors and conditions moving up to the altar rails and returning with their foreheads signed with ash. And the old grim message was being repeated over each penitent: 'Dust thou art and unto dust thou shalt return.' One grows parched for that straight style of speech in the desert of modern euphemisms ...

Nor did this Dead White Male overlook another aspect of piety below the Mason-Dixon line:

One of the things which inspires him [the Catholic visitor] most is the heroic fidelity of the Negro Catholics. ... Theirs was a sharper test than the white Catholics had earlier undergone, for here the persecutors were fellow-members in the Household of the Faith. But supernaturally, they knew the character of the Church better than their clergy ... honor must never be neglected to those thousands of colored Catholics who so accurately traced their Master's road amid insult and injury.

Middlebrow media campaigns, at their most virulent in the prole-worshipping Harold Macmillan years, loved to execrate Waugh's "snobbery." These

campaigns have quietened down to an amazing extent since the Cold War ended, from which fact we can infer the real motivations for vilifying the postwar era's sole world-renowned native-born Englishman with a complete philosophy to set against "darkness at noon." Besides, there remains the little matter of Waugh's imaginative needs. Upward social climbing is entirely compatible with—indeed often a necessary complement to—literary genius: behold Goethe, Stendhal, and Wodehouse as well as Waugh. Downward social climbing, on the other hand, produces only such grotesque artifacts as Auden, Brecht, John Osborne, the senile Tolstoy, and the Republican National Committee.

It is strange that those readiest to denounce Waugh for "elitist" sins that are not sins at all should apparently be blind to Waugh's gravest and most obvious vice: his creative suicide through protracted alcoholism. No family background or childhood "trauma" (a term he disdained) can account for Waugh's boozing. Nor, to his credit, did Waugh stoop to the "I blame society" trope when describing his dipso state.

As everyone familiar with Gilbert Pinfold knows, Waugh used grog partly to wash down his industrial-strength sedative intake—although raging insomnia had long been an effect, quite as much as a cause, of his over-indulgences. In a 1964 letter he assured a friend, "I have practically given up drinking." His concept of near-sobriety comprised (the same letter explains) seven weekly bottles of wine and three weekly bottles of spirits, plus 40 weekly grams of sodium amytal and a weekly bottle of paraldehyde. Contemporaneously, what little cause for wider optimism he possessed had vanished with Vatican II, concerning which he proved incapable of accepting casuistic official bromides about how the conciliar church was just like the preconiliar church, only 100 times

better. Once Waugh received a commission to write the life of Swift; although he never tackled this project, he achieved a certain Swiftian climax of his own by suffering his fatal thrombosis while inside a lavatory.

Not only has no younger author taken his place in English letters, no younger author has ever seriously been considered for that place. Even those who can occasionally mimic Waugh's idiom have shown a complete failure to emulate Waugh's courage. They routinely drown out their own utterances by the unmistakable sound of backs being scratched. Contemplating him, we may well allude to Wordsworth for our own purposes: "Waugh, thou shouldst be living at this hour: England [and America] hath need of thee." How many million Africans have starved to death because our masters insisted on reading Frantz Fanon and Willy Brandt—or, worse still, on hailing Dame Bob Geldof as a thinker—when they should instead have been reading Waugh's *Black Mischief*? Where is the Waugh of our own day to proclaim what all now know (but few dare admit) about Thatcherism's true nature: a mere manic, squalid, and saber-toothed variant of the same Servile State which it purported to oppose? What could be more like something out of *Vile Bodies*' first draft than the ennoblement of Thatcherism's best-known advertising sleazebag as "Lord Saatchi"? Who would not enjoy Waugh flagellating Tony Blair, walloping Michael Novak, or overtly marveling at how so many pseudo-conservatives—who preen themselves on their anti-feminism—manage to regard Private Lynndie England with approbation bordering on downright lust?

It could plausibly be argued that the whole of Russell Kirk is contained in a single section from one of Waugh's supreme masterpieces, *Robbery Under Law*, where he holds up to his most blistering ridicule the Jacobin gangster

regime that had already terrorized Mexico for a generation. (Graham Greene treated this subject in *The Power and the Glory*, where alone among his novels he approached Waugh's stature.) The regime's *Jefe Máximo* in 1938, Lázaro Cárdenas, threatened Washington with that same mixture of bullying, wheedling, and begging familiar from Vicente Fox's discourses today. (Although Cárdenas preferred old-style property expropriations to Fox's demographic warfare.) *Robbery Under Law*, after treating its readers to one of the most magnificently homicidal anti-Wilsonian enfilades ever fired, concludes thus:

A conservative is not merely an obstructionist who wishes to resist the introduction of novelties; nor is

he, as was assumed by most 19th-century parliamentarians, a brake to frivolous experiment. He has positive work to do ... Civilization has no force of its own beyond what is given from within. It is under constant assault and it takes most of the energies of civilized man to keep going at all ... If [it] falls we shall see not merely the dissolution of a few joint-stock corporations, but of the spiritual and material achievements of our history. There is nothing, except ourselves, to stop our own countries becoming like Mexico. That is the moral, for us, of her decay. ■

R.J. Stove lives in Melbourne, Australia.

Worthington's World

A Libertarian Society Based on Reductionism

I offer a manifesto
for self-sufficient
humanism.

<http://worthingtonsworld.com>

This website further elaborates on my theme in "CASCADING UNIVERSE"* wherein I endeavor to somewhat bridge the gap between current science and God.

* Dorrance Publishing Co.
701 Smithfield St.
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-3906
dorordr@dorrancepublishing.com

Buying CAFTA

Congressional leaders offered a pork payoff to those who abandoned their principles.

By W. James Antle III

"FREE TRADE ISN'T FREE" has long been a favorite slogan of economic nationalists. Supporters of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) seem to have adopted it themselves. Congressman Ron Paul's (R-Texas) office has estimated that the pork-barrel projects and other deals struck in order to secure the agreement's passage will end up costing taxpayers at least \$50 billion.

CAFTA was the toughest sell on Capitol Hill of any multilateral trade agreement in recent memory. It passed the House by just 217 to 215, making it possible to argue that virtually every supporter cast the deciding vote, only after the leadership extended voting nearly an hour beyond the normal 15-minute time limit. The Senate approved CAFTA by 55 to 45, the lowest margin ever recorded in that body for a free-trade agreement.

House Majority Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) described the notoriously pork-laden \$286.4 billion transportation bill as being "very effective" in lining up recalcitrant Republicans. Senate and House Republican leaders held off a final vote on the bill until CAFTA's fate had been decided. The president also helped when he backed off his threat to veto the highway bill if it contained too many extraneous projects, and Bush made a rare trip to the Capitol to sway reluctant congressmen.

Sen. Christopher Bond (R-Mo.) was one beneficiary. He announced that he was "more comfortable" voting for CAFTA after he had won \$2.5 billion for his home state to build dams and locks along the Mississippi River.

Those who bucked the White House and the leadership on CAFTA in some cases had their projects fare less well. Congressmen Virgil Goode (R-Va.) and Walter Jones (R-N.C.), two of the most vocal GOP opponents, saw the final House-Senate conference report slash their high-priority highway projects by 70 percent compared to the version that had passed the House. Although there have been denials that these cuts were a consequence of their anti-CAFTA votes, a spokesman for Congressman Blunt acknowledged to *National Journal* that other Republicans had been more muted in their opposition to the pact "and there's no question that type of approach was appreciated."

Some members sought less tangible benefits than bridges, dams, and trade protections for their local industries. Congressman Robin Hayes (R-N.C.) told reporters that he was "flat-out, completely, horizontally opposed" and that CAFTA "was not in the interests of the constituents I represent." He initially voted no, but after last-minute pressure from the GOP leadership he switched his vote in exchange for assurances that they would try to shield him from the political consequences.

House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) made unspecified promises to do whatever was possible to help Hayes's district keep jobs. Hayes has claimed to have extracted from the Bush administration a guarantee to enforce textile protections and back a new Hong Kong Customs Enforcement pact.

Sens. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) and Norm Coleman (R-Minn.) cut a deal to

sway senators from sugar states. Under its terms, the Bush administration would preserve a 1.5 million ton cap on sugar imports used to support domestic prices. Sugar in excess of the cap would be bought by the Department of Agriculture, which would convert it into ethanol rather than use it for food.

Yet there are questions about whether some of these members will ever get anything in return for their bargains. Public Citizen, a D.C.-based organization that opposed CAFTA, has looked at 90 such deals conducted between 1992 and 2004. Their conclusion: administrations of both parties have reneged on about 80 percent of them. "They're really non-deals," says Todd Tucker, research director for Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch. "They won't come to pass."

Tucker and his colleagues have compiled a list of likely "non-deals." Congressman Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.) boasts that his congressional district is the "sock capital." He was leaning against CAFTA, calling it a "job-killer" and an "outsourcing agreement." The administration won his vote by promising to seek a modification to the agreement pertaining to sock tariffs. Instead of occurring immediately, tariffs on socks imported from our CAFTA trading partners would be phased out gradually over 10 years.

But no other CAFTA country has indicated that they are willing to agree to the modification Aderholt seeks. The administration is not even legally bound to lobby them.

Congressman Steve LaTourette (R-Ohio) was another likely CAFTA oppo-

nent the leadership prevailed upon to switch sides.

The Cleveland Republican said he changed his mind for the good of furniture makers in his district. He argued that CAFTA contained an 8 percent tariff cut on plywood imports. This would make it cheaper for furniture makers to use plywood and help them create new jobs. LaTourette claimed his vote would “make the difference between them making stuff in America or not.”

CAFTA opponents, however, countered that LaTourette had been duped. Plywood imports from most CAFTA countries had already been duty-free for 10 years under other existing trade agreements. Thus there was no benefit to offset the potential job losses to his district under the trade pact.

When did free-trade deals, which are sold on the grounds of competition, less government, and opening up markets, become such logrolling sessions? The CAFTA debate seemingly hinged on selective protections, subsidies, and taxpayer-funded projects going to supporters’ districts. Congressman Paul, who voted against CAFTA despite his own support for free trade, called the process by which it was passed “embarrassing.”

“These kinds of agreements really have very little to do with trade,” argues Tucker. “Instead of simplifying trade rules, they are thousands of pages long.”

Observers suggest that this process may become familiar. If public support for CAFTA-style agreements continues to wane, we could see even bigger outbreaks of arm-twisting and taxpayer-funded promise-making in the future.

“These trade deals are unpopular and getting more unpopular all the time,” says Tucker. “CAFTA is a relatively minor agreement, economically speaking. It’s all just a precursor to the Free Trade of the Americas Act.”

If this is the case, free trade may start getting rather more expensive. ■

Stephen Hadley, President Bush’s national security adviser, has increased pressure on CIA Director Porter Goss to capture or kill Osama bin Laden,

even though most intelligence experts believe that eliminating bin Laden would do little to diminish the level of terrorism worldwide. The major shift in CIA resources to the Pakistani-Afghan border area where bin Laden is hiding has reduced the number of operations against terrorist groups active elsewhere. In Washington it has also resulted in intensified analysis of all intelligence relating to al-Qaeda even when the information is transparently bogus. Two recent rumors that bin Laden had been wounded in the leg and might be dying were laboriously investigated even though the intelligence was not credible. The White House desperately wants a symbolic victory in the campaign against terrorism to help reverse the steady decline in support for the war in Iraq.



The Iraqi insurgency has possibly spilled over into neighboring Jordan and could spread farther.

The Iraqi government has called on Jordan to crack down on its resident Iraqis, and the Jordanians have agreed to monitor official border crossing points. The long desert frontiers are, however, hard to secure and illegal border crossers and smugglers number in the thousands, facilitated by the tribes that are located on both sides of the border. Saddam Hussein’s arms depots in Iraq were looted after the coalition’s invasion, and many weapons were smuggled from Iraq to Jordan and to Saudi Arabia, most of them finding their way to criminals and terrorist groups. The Katyusha rockets that were recently fired from a Jordanian hilltop at U.S. warships moored in the port of Aqaba were almost certainly Iraqi arms that were brought in by smugglers and sold to local terrorists. The claim of responsibility by the al-Qaeda-linked Abdullah Azzam Brigades notwithstanding, the poorly planned and executed attacks suggest a more local provenance, possibly including Iraqis linked to the insurgency inside Iraq.



The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has taken issue with assertions made in the media that terrorists will find it simple to bring about disasters by attacking chemical plants or electricity grids and by spreading botulinum toxin.

FAS notes a claim made in the *New York Times* that terrorists could use a 27-page manual obtained on the Internet to manufacture quantities of botulinum toxin that could cause thousands of casualties. According to FAS, no lab scientist would agree that the procedure is that simple. The prevailing notion that there exists a hyper-competent terrorist, possessing all the skills of a scientist combined with the resourcefulness of a trained commando, has become a common theme in public discussions of terrorism, but it is fatuous. Glib reiterations of terrorist capabilities promote fear and a sense of hopelessness, and also render less effective limited security and financial resources by spreading them thin in response to widespread public alarm. This diminishes the ability of police and security services to respond to the most likely method of attack: the suicide bomber carrying ordinary explosives and blowing himself up in an environment where many civilian casualties are likely.

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA Officer, is a partner in Cannistraro Associates.

Arts & Letters

FILM

[*The Constant Gardener*]

Big Pharma Colonizes Africa

By Steve Sailer

THE RIP-SNORTING Brazilian gangster epic “City of God,” a *favela* offshoot of Martin Scorsese’s “Goodfellas,” is deservedly celebrated as one of the best films of the decade. So anticipation had been keen for director Fernando Meirelles’s follow-up, “The Constant Gardener,” an adaptation of the best-seller about corporate conspiracies in Kenya by John le Carré, who has long been acclaimed a literary master in America (although his fellow Brits tend to view him as a bit of a hack). And indeed, early critical response for the film has been dutifully rapturous.

Sadly, “The Constant Gardener” is a disappointment, a motion-sickness-inducing pseudo-thriller that leaves last spring’s similarly themed “The Interpreter” looking masterful by comparison.

Meirelles appears to have been defeated by both the grinding difficulty of filming in Nairobi and by the smugness and preposterousness of le Carré’s plot about nice white people battling to save Africa from mean white people.

“Hotel Rwanda,” despite its catering to white liberal self-obsession, at least was about some closely observed Africans. “The Constant Gardener,” in contrast, exemplifies how cinematic political correctness, the fear of showing human differences, strips Africans of

their distinctiveness, rendering them ciphers who merely suffer nobly at the hands of fascinating white villains.

“The Constant Gardener” of the title is a handsome but passive British diplomat (Ralph Fiennes of “The English Patient”) married to a feisty but gorgeous activist wife (Rachel Weisz of “The Mummy”). Her anti-racist dedication is so saintly that she refuses to have their baby delivered at a white-run hospital. If Weisz’s character were real, she’d be appalling, but fortunately even the most radically chic put their own babies’ survival above their ideological fashion statements.

When she loses the child in a hellhole slum clinic, she barely notices because she can tell that the European scientists examining the dying tribeswoman in the next bed are up to no good. She discovers that the nefarious multinational pharmaceutical firm is testing a new tuberculosis drug in Kenya on patients dying of both AIDS and TB without obtaining—you’ll be shocked to learn—their fully informed consent. Although le Carré’s Cold War spy stories were endlessly praised for the moral ambiguity he discerned within the KGB, he portrays “Big Pharma” as the epitome of evil.

Objectively speaking, overly aggressive clinical trials must rank about 312th on the list of Africa’s most pressing problems, in between overcrowded buses and hostile hippopotamuses. (Ludicrously, the screenplay claims that the evil corporation is cutting corners to rush the pill to market because of the obscene profits it will make preventing an epidemic of a new antibiotic-resistant form of TB that threatens to kill two billion people. In that case, the drug company would deserve a tickertape parade.) But unlike Africa’s major tribulations—many of which stem from its

traditional polygamous and matrilineal family structures that are profoundly dysfunctional in the modern world—slipshod drug testing is one that can be rightfully blamed on white people.

Don’t assume, though, that le Carré and the American critics who revere him are consumed by white guilt. They’re not blaming themselves, just white people they already hate. White culturati use black victims as props in their endless competition to win superior moral status over other whites, especially ones who make more money than they do.

Meirelles has been telling gullible interviewers that being Brazilian gave him special insight into the Third World suffering of Kenyans. But the blue-eyed, redheaded director comes from a land that, while blighted by poverty, also features enough First World technical competence to make jetliners, not to mention terrific movies like “City of God.” The Oscar-nominated filmmaker would have been wiser to shoot “The Constant Gardener” in South Africa, another country where crime and chaos coexist with modern proficiency. Instead, he imprudently chose Kenya, once perhaps the best-organized African country but now badly decayed.

Visually, “The Constant Gardener” is so consistently out of focus, wobbly, overexposed, and filmed looking up somebody’s nostril from eight inches away that I had to move to the back of the theatre to keep from getting a headache. I suspect Meirelles found it unfeasible to get his Kenyan footage to look consistently well made, so he chose to make it all look bad in the hopes that the critics would assume it was his latest brilliant aesthetic breakthrough. ■

Rated R for language, some violent images, and sexual content/nudity.

BOOKS

[1776, David McCullough, Simon & Schuster, 386 pages]

America's Glorious Cause

By Roger D. McGrath

DAVID MCCULLOUGH has written another book that will be bought and read by hundreds of thousands of Americans, perhaps millions. Professional historians, their degrees framed on the walls of their offices and their salaries funded by hard-working taxpayers, will eat their hearts out once again. Their books will not sell or be read except as a requirement for their own graduate seminars. The reason is obvious. Professors in academe today generally discount good, old-fashioned narrative history for Marxist theory, psychoanalytical biography, social history, quantifying studies, or postmodern deconstructionism. They write only for themselves, and their prose is politically correct, agenda-driven, dull, vapid, or impenetrable. Once upon a time college professors commanded a wide audience and helped make the American people historically literate. Now that job is left to David McCullough and others like him who have not forgotten that a historian's principal job is to tell a good story and to tell it with passion, insight, suspense, poignancy, and power. McCullough does so brilliantly.

History is about people—living, breathing, flesh-and-bone people—and McCullough never forgets this. His latest effort, *1776*, is all about the people who fought for the Glorious Cause in the year of the Declaration of Independence. He clearly loves the cause and those who followed General Washington in a year that was full of victories and defeats, drama and boredom, courage and cowardice, sacrifice and selfishness, and

optimism and despair for the American rebels. McCullough takes the reader into the ranks of the American troops, into their disease-plagued camps, their battlefronts, their homes, their love lives, their thoughts and beliefs. His extensive use of primary documents, including letters, diaries, and memoirs, generates an intimacy and an immediacy that makes for a page-by-page adventure. The reader can't help but become a participant in the Glorious Cause.

McCullough begins his story with the debates in Parliament over the troubles in the American colonies. Whigs and Tories were very much in disagreement, but so too were Whig and Whig and Tory and Tory. It is difficult not to be reminded of America's involvement in Iraq today. Augustus Henry Fitzroy, the Duke of Grafton and a former prime minister, contended that he had once agreed with the government's hard-line policy that the colonists should and could be whipped into submission, but now he realized that he had been misled and deceived. He astonished his fellow lords by urging the repeal of every parliamentary act aimed at the colonies from the Stamp Act forward. "This, I will venture to assert," said Fitzroy, "will answer every end; and nothing less will accomplish any effectual purpose, without scenes of ruin and destruction, which I cannot think on without the utmost grief and horror."

Others remained resolute in their determination to punish the impudent colonists. Edward Gibbon, a member of the House of Commons who was busy writing the *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, thought the power of the British Empire must be "exerted to the utmost." This meant mobilizing the empire's manpower. "Irish papists, Hanoverians, Canadians, Indians, etc. will all in various shapes be employed," wrote Gibbon, reminding me of neocon Max Boot's recent proposal of United States citizenship for any foreigner willing to serve in the American armed forces.

McCullough, though, is primarily concerned with the American rebels, from

lowly privates to General Washington himself. McCullough is clearly enamored with Washington, and so too were all who came into contact with him. Without him it is likely the War for Independence would have been a failed insurrection. McCullough is at his best when describing Washington's hold on men:

Joseph Reed, a young man with a long jaw and a somewhat quizzical look in his eyes, was a charming, London-trained Philadelphia lawyer who had been chosen as part of an honorary escort when Washington departed Philadelphia for his new command. Reed had intended to ride only as far as New York, but found himself so in awe of the general that he continued on to Cambridge to become Washington's secretary, despite the fact that he had made no provisions for his wife and three young children or for his law practice. As Reed explained, Washington had 'expressed himself to me in such terms that I thought myself bound by every tie of duty and honor to comply with his request to help him through the sea of difficulties.'

Sea of difficulties was right. Washington himself often privately expressed that if he had fully appreciated the magnitude of the task he faced, he never would have accepted his appointment as commanding general. That he never revealed his inner turmoil, persevered through the darkest of times, and never failed to inspire his men to heroic sacrifice for the Glorious Cause seems like something out of Greek legend.

While Washington, a Virginia aristocrat of great physical stature and social standing who had fought in the French and Indian War, was reasonably well prepared for the task that was thrust upon him, many other American leaders came from humble and unlikely origins. Nathanael Greene, when only 33 years old, became the youngest general officer in the American army. By that time he had only been an active-duty soldier for

less than a year. Before the War for Independence erupted he had never served in a campaign and had never fought in a battle. He was a foundryman by trade, and everything he knew about warfare and the duties of an officer came from books. Moreover, a childhood accident had left him with a gimpy leg, and he suffered from asthma. The leg caused his initial rejection as an officer. Undeterred, he gamely served as a private. His intelligence, courage, bearing, and leadership qualities quickly became apparent. He rapidly rose through the ranks and was put in command of all American forces from Rhode Island. Like Washington, he could transfix men with his eyes. A soldier recalled his "fine blue eyes, which struck me with a considerable degree of awe, that I could scarcely deliver my message."

Also commanding attention as well as coming from a nonmilitary background was Henry Knox. The seventh of 10 sons of Scots-Irish immigrants, the Boston-

born Knox evidently got plenty of food. He stood a little over six feet and weighed something in excess of 250 pounds. He had a booming voice, a razor-sharp mind, a gregarious nature, and, despite his mass, boundless energy. His father had died when Knox was a young child, and he had worked hard to support his mother. By his early twenties he had his own bookstore in a fashionable section of Boston, offering a "large and very elegant assortment" of the latest books and magazines, according to his advertisement in the *Boston Gazette*. John Adams was a regular at Knox's bookstore. Nathanael Greene was another. Greene and Knox shared a love for military history and the art of war, each reading dozens of books on the subjects. Knox was especially fascinated with gunnery and tactics and became something of an armchair authority on both. His knowledge would come in handy. Like Greene, Knox was also less than entirely physically sound. During a hunting trip a shotgun had exploded when he fired at a duck, leaving him without two fingers on his left hand.

The injury did not slow the massive bookseller. He was soon courting the daughter of a prominent British official. Her father was upset by the thought of having a bloody Scots-Irish colonial for a son-in-law and tried to prevent the marriage. When he failed to stop the nuptials, he arranged for Knox to be commissioned in the British army to afford him some respectability. Knox declined the offer and, when the first shots were fired at Lexington and Concord, he and his bride slipped out of Boston in disguise to join the Glorious Cause. The in-laws would later sail for England and never set eyes on their daughter again. A writer of fiction could not hope to compete with McCullough's purely factual but wonderfully spun storytelling.

It was, of course, Henry Knox who suggested to Washington that the dozens of cannons at far away Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain be retrieved for use against the British at Boston. Knox's plan was audacious, but

Washington gave his consent and put Knox in command of the expedition. By mid-November, Knox was underway, moving his men at up to 40 miles a day and reaching Fort Ticonderoga on Dec. 5. Now the fun began. Knox selected 58 mortars and cannons for transportation, some 120,000 pounds of iron and brass. By sleds, by barges, by manpower, by ox power, Knox began moving the weapons towards Boston. It was an epic expedition, over mountains, down valleys and rivers, across lakes, and through forests, inspired, driven, and sustained by Henry "The Ox" Knox. Whenever the expedition came upon a town, the settlers turned out to gawk and cheer. "We were great gainers by this curiosity," said a member of the expedition, "for while they were employed in remarking upon our guns, we were, with equal pleasure, discussing the qualities of their cider and whiskey. These were generously brought out in great profusion."

Knox arrived outside Boston with every gun intact. Washington fully appreciated the feat and immediately put Knox in command of the artillery. Moreover, the sudden increase in American firepower made British positions in Boston untenable. On St. Patrick's Day, the British evacuated the city. It was a stunning turn of events for the Redcoats and a tremendous morale boost for the ragtag Americans.

Day by day, week by week, McCullough takes the reader through 1776 and develops an intimacy with the Greens, Knoxes, and dozens of others who fought in the Glorious Cause. There were nearly as many failures as successes, but again and again the American rebels demonstrated an indomitable spirit, clearly evident in both word and deed. McCullough's descriptions make one proud to be an American, something that is prohibited in academe today, but something that partly explains the popularity of his work. Connecticut farm boy Joseph Martin, after facing a far larger British force, declared, "I never spent a thought about numbers. The Americans were invincible in my opinion." Another militiaman said that there was not a man

MOVING?

Changing your address?

Simply go to **The American Conservative** website, www.amconmag.com. Click "subscribe" and then click "address change."

To access your account make sure you have your TAC mailing label. You may also subscribe or renew online.

If you prefer to mail your address change send your TAC label with your new address to:

The American Conservative
Subscription Department
P.O. Box 9030
Maple Shade, NJ 08052-9030

in the ranks who did not consider himself the equal to two or three British soldiers. The Scots-Irish riflemen from the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontiers were especially disdainful of the massive numbers the British could put in the field. "Just more targets, boys," summed up their feelings.

Through all of this Washington looms larger than life. Had he been born in classical antiquity, said the *Pennsylvania Journal*, he would have been worshipped as a god. "If there are spots on his character, they are like the spots on the sun, only discernible by the magnifying powers of a telescope." McCullough argues persuasively that his efforts and leadership were little short of miraculous. On the last day of December 1776, with enlistments expiring in the Continental Army and the men eager to return home, a formation was called and the assembled men asked to step forward to re-enlist. Drums rolled, but no one moved. Then appeared General Washington, mounted on a splendid horse. Speaking extemporaneously he addressed the men, as one soldier put it, "in the most affectionate manner":

My brave fellows, you have done all I asked you to do, and more than could be reasonably expected, but your country is at stake, your wives, your houses, and all you hold dear. You have worn yourselves out with fatigues and hardships, but we know not how to spare you. If you will consent to stay one month longer, you will render that service to the cause of liberty, and to your country, which you can probably never do under any other circumstance.

Again the drums rolled, but this time the weary veterans stepped forward. "God Almighty," declared Nathanael Greene, "inclined their hearts to listen to the proposal and they engaged anew." ■

Roger D. McGrath is an historian in California and the author of Gunfighters, Highwaymen and Vigilantes.

[*No Country for Old Men*, Cormac McCarthy, Knopf, 309 pages]

Strangers in a Strange Land

By Arthur Versluis

READING A NOVEL by Cormac McCarthy is a strange experience. It reads smoothly and quickly, with occasional passages of startling beauty. Yet you come up against scenes so unrelenting that you have to force yourself to continue. His latest book is no exception.

No Country for Old Men is of a piece with McCarthy's earlier fiction in setting—the desert highlands of New Mexico and Texas—and in style—laconic dialogue without much punctuation. Indeed, McCarthy's work is remarkably consistent over the 40 years of his published life: his characters, hardened men, live against other hardened men and a harsh, unforgiving landscape beautifully described.

Like Herman Melville (especially in his later years), McCarthy has seen the worst dimensions of man, and his fiction exists as a kind of accusation. He holds up to our view images of humanity that we do not want to see, and he requires that we look nonetheless.

An example of this is the second in his "border trilogy" of novels, *The Crossing*. In it, a young man named Billy Parham traps a pregnant wolf and then decides to take her back across the border to Mexico to set her free. He manages to get her over the border by muzzling her, but in the end they are captured by Mexicans who exhibit the wolf in a carnival and eventually kill her. The description of the wild wolf is extraordinary, and the tale becomes tragically symbolic of the casual viciousness of humanity. At the end of the novel, Billy has become so calloused that he throws stones at the old, abused, now purblind family dog when it recognizes him because he can't find it in himself to risk caring for it. The novel ends with Billy weeping at the

onset of a new day in this "godmade" world.

McCarthy's fiction asks us what manner of world it is that is host to the slaughter depicted. Is the human world we see in McCarthy's fiction really "godmade"? How does one account for human evil, for the heartlessness of man's treatment of his fellow man or of animals and the natural world? Here McCarthy is in the same metaphysical territory as Melville was in such works as *Billy Budd* and *The Confidence Man*, and he is every bit as aware of human greed, ignorance, and destructiveness.

No Country for Old Men engages these same questions but with a peculiar kind of intensity. At the center of the novel is a serial killer named Anton Chigurh (ironically pronounced "sugar"), a soulless assassin. But the whole novel is filled with scenes of murder and mayhem from the very beginning, when a hunter named Llewelyn Moss finds the remains of a drug deal gone bad, including dead and dying men and more than \$2 million in cash. When Moss takes the money, he catalyzes a series of subsequent murders by rival mercenaries seeking to recover it. Among those mercenaries, and by far the most formidable of them, is Chigurh. What makes him arresting as a character is not his cunning but his adherence to his own peculiar, cold-hearted "principles," his belief that he incarnates fate—he is an implacable and inhuman force. Into this character, McCarthy distills his essential challenge to us: where, in a world that includes such monstrous people, is human goodness?

It is here that we encounter the meanings of the title, *No Country for Old Men*, which can be read several ways. One reading is that McCarthy depicts a country in which old men do not survive—it is a world of tragic fates, bloodshed, hubris, and death. Another reading is that the country old men can remember no longer exists. It has been replaced by a new America, one marked by murders, drug deals, and blithe inhumanity. Every interpretation of the title has a bitter taste.

Still, the novel turns, in the end, not on the character of Chigurh but on that of the aging local sheriff, Ed Tom Bell, who in the course of the novel has to come to terms with a new world populated by criminals who think nothing of massacring one another—or anyone else. Bell is a good man who has devoted his life to protecting his locale and its folks. Bell tells us he “has a job where you have pretty much the same authority as God,” but “it takes very little to govern good people,” while “bad people can’t be governed at all. Or if they could I never heard of it.”

Bell’s dilemma is that for him to confront the kinds of killers he now sees, he has to become like them—in his own words, he has to put his soul at hazard. And that is something he is not willing to do. *No Country for Old Men* is, at heart, about the collision of the world of human community, of kindness and the beauty of wilderness, with an inhuman human world ruled by greed and impersonal slaughter. (Chigurh often uses a

his wife, Loretta—the sharp details of the landscape, the basic human decency of ordinary folk, and we realize that the novel is about the fragility of these and how critical it is to safeguard them. Humanity and enduring nature are thus foregrounded against a society that degenerates all too quickly into total and indifferent violence, greed, and chaos.

Seen from a distance, *No Country for Old Men* is a parable about conserving or wasting human life. Our most valuable literary critic and man of letters, George Panichas, has pointed out the value of drawing upon the word “conservator” rather than upon the nowadays more ideologically charged, frequently misleading word “conservative,” and indeed, McCarthy’s novel encourages us to consider our own roles as conservators.

No Country for Old Men depicts the tension that always has existed in American life between lawlessness on the one hand and essential individual and local

gets in their way. And above them is a nameless man in a suit, protected in a distant office. Much of this bears a disturbing resemblance to state-sponsored warfare like that in Iraq, in which protected men in suits and fine offices also direct mayhem from afar without getting their hands dirty. *No Country for Old Men* is a book about how men must choose between war and human decency.

McCarthy’s fiction—spare, taut, nearly as lean as Hemingway’s—exemplifies that classic American form, the Western, but its ramifications are wide and deep. For his fiction includes metaphysical dimensions that cannot be avoided. His Southwestern landscape, hot, dry, and pitiless, reveals a harshness in humanity that calls forth ultimate questions, the answers to which define rifts that run deep within American literature. On the one side are those who affirm the innate goodness of humanity and the optimism of an Emerson—and on the other side are pessimists on the order of Melville. McCarthy is closer to the latter.

No Country for Old Men, in all its grisliness, shows us two kinds of people: one, utterly without conscience and absolutely destructive, holding to lunatic “principles” that lead inexorably to murder, even of innocents; and the other, much more fragile, holding on to principles of community and protection of others and of the land. McCarthy’s novel asks us to which of these groups we belong, and whether what we leave behind is in plain fact no country for old men. It’s not always clear to me what the answers of “conservatives” are to such questions, but it’s usually pretty apparent who’s a conservator and who isn’t. We may want to avert our eyes, but McCarthy’s fiction compels us to look anew at ancient questions, at ourselves, and at our society. ■

Arthur Versluis is professor of American Studies at Michigan State University and author of numerous books, including *The Esoteric Origins of the American Renaissance*.

NO COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN JUXTAPOSES SUCH BRUTALITY AGAINST FRIENDLY RURAL AND SMALL-TOWN LIFE, THEREBY ASKING US WHICH SOCIETY WE ARE LIVING IN, AND WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO CONSERVE.

cattle stun gun as a murder weapon.) It is thus a novel that compels us to question what American society is, or is becoming, and what our role is in those changes.

There is a paradox here, of course. By depicting such pitiless bloodshed, McCarthy could be accused of the same thing that film directors like Oliver Stone or Quentin Tarantino are in fact guilty of: creating a more callous society. But *No Country for Old Men* juxtaposes such brutality against friendly rural and small-town life, thereby asking us which society we are living in, and what is most important to conserve. When we step back from the novel as a whole, we recall the moments of tenderness between couples—most notably between Bell and

decency on the other, and by the extremity of its examples, it foregrounds the kinds of archetypal decisions that we are each called upon to make. These decisions, individually and cumulatively, define us each as conservators of what is most valuable in human life—or, in the stark relief of the Southwestern desert, as conscienceless destroyers. Like Bell, we’re all called to make choices that add up to an ultimate choice.

In the novel’s background, not surprisingly, is war. Bell himself is a veteran, and the book’s main revelation turns on this fact. *No Country for Old Men* reveals a shadowy conflagration taking place, both sides being drug dealers and criminals who think nothing of shooting one another or anyone who

[How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization, Thomas E. Woods Jr., Regnery, 256 pages]

Monks Who Made the Modern World

By David Cowan

EACH SUNDAY during the academic term, the medieval colleges of Oxford and Cambridge have a beautiful evening service with guest preachers invited to address a mixture of Fellows, students, guests, tourists, and others. Sadly, apart from the colleges world famous for their choral tradition, these services average a congregation of perhaps 40, and that includes the choir. The college prayers are offered up in a way that harks back to an era when the chapel was more central to college and university life, a time when the church was closely tied to the intellectual life of all right-thinking people. It is a time that Thomas E. Woods wants to remind us of, as one that could guide us through the crisis of modern secularism.

In an age of progressivism and cultural relativism, Woods takes us back to an era not just of certainty but also intellectual excitement and discovery. He argues that Western civilization is indebted to the church for many of the advances in our society, from law and the sciences through to art and economics. The debt owed by each of these disciplines to the intellectual milieu of the medieval world is carefully set out.

In international law, for example, the discovery of the Americas provided the opportunity for theologians of the day to examine the ill treatment by the Spanish of the New World natives and led to recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples. Among the more significant thinkers was the Thomist philosopher Francisco de Vitoria, who is sometimes called the father of international law. Vitoria extended natural-law reasoning

to the international level, arguing that all peoples were bound by the *jus gentium*, those universal rules that the whole of mankind might naturally follow.

Likewise in economics, Woods cites schoolmen Jean Buridan and Nicolas Oresme as early analysts of monetary theory. Oresme laid the foundations of Gresham's Law, which states that bad money drives good money out of circulation, earning Oresme the title in some quarters as the "founding father of monetary economics." In the hard sciences, the inventiveness of Catholic priests spawned new disciplines as diverse as atomic theory, aviation, and Egyptology.

The glue of this intellectual tradition, Woods argues, was the monastic movement, especially the Benedictines. Saint Benedict himself, born around AD 480, is warmly cited as the father of modern Europe. It is appropriate then that the new pope took the name Benedict as he leads the Roman Catholic Church of today in an age of prevalent secularism in Europe. On choosing this name, the new pope said, "I recall Saint Benedict of Norcia, co-patron of Europe, whose life evokes the Christian roots of Europe." Saint Benedict famously wrote "the Rule" for following the contemplative life, and an order was founded in his name.

There are some enduring images in this book, such as the meetings of abbots from across Europe to share practical knowledge, a kind of monastic Davos, except they were masters of theology rather than MBAs. Highlighting the distance between then and now, Woods tells of the controversy surrounding Tracey Emin's Turner Prize work "My Bed," comprising an unmade bed, bottles of vodka, used prophylactics and bloodied undergarments. Amusingly, when an act of vandalism occurred, with two naked men jumping on the bed and drinking the vodka, applause broke out in the gallery as people thought this was part of the artwork.

It was in confrontation with spiritual barbarism that the church guarded its worth well, through the learning, charity, and labor of the monks. They created illustrated Bibles that transmitted the

Missing Any Issues of The American Conservative?

Order copies today.

\$6 per issue postage paid.

Please indicate quantity:

October 7, 2002

___ Vol 1, No. 1
___ First Issue!

December 2, 2002

___ Norman Mailer
on Empire

March 24, 2003

___ Whose War?

February 2, 2004

___ Cheney Builds
an Empire

March 15, 2004

___ Gibson's
Passion

April 26, 2004

___ Pinocchio
Presidency

July 5, 2004

___ Reagan
Commemorative Issue

September 27, 2004

___ Where the Right Went Wrong
___ All 6 issues published in 2002
___ All 24 issues published in 2003
___ All 24 issues published in 2004

Name _____

Please print

Address _____

City _____

State _____

Zip _____

TAC50926

Send your order with payment to:

The American Conservative
1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120
Arlington, VA 22209



texts that would eventually cast out the barbarians and prevent Europe from sinking into a moral morass. A few hundred years later and the monastic movement still preserves the Gospel against Vandals and Goths of a different sort. In the Europe of today, the old monasteries serve as a beacon for tourists, and Gregorian chant outsells much of the dross that serves as music. This may be some people's only contact with the faith, and it illustrates that the monks knew how to encyst the light of the Gospel in culture, even in the darkest days of human disbelief.

Ultimately, the civilization-building of the medieval world was founded on an understanding of the centrality of God and that the pursuit of knowledge was the discovery of the marvels that God had provided for us. This was a time when Saint Anselm wrote that faith seeks understanding, perhaps one of the most insightful statements in the history of theology. It was this intellectual drive that helped to define Western society, with a striving for new knowledge and the proliferation of human disciplines constructed around such learning.

The medieval era was typified by a unified Western Christendom, having decisively split from the Eastern churches in the Great Schism of 1054.

This medieval Catholic Church of which Woods writes is now buried under the rubble of modernity, and it could also be argued that it is buried under the rubble of the modern church. Since the medieval period, the church has continually fragmented, and the obvious question begged by the title is whose Catholic church?

Where critics might take Woods to task is in the question of how the vibrant church of which he writes in glowing terms contrived to get itself into the situation that caused a great many to push not just for reform but for a new church altogether. Certainly, the monastic movement, which is arguably idealized in Woods's account, and the papacy were in need of reform. Whether the Protestant Reformation was the way to go about it is naturally debatable.

How the Catholic Church Built Western Civilization contains some unfair criticism of Martin Luther, whom Woods terms "as inveterate an enemy of the Catholic Church as ever lived." This is far from the truth, since Luther was part of that Catholic Church, and his attempts at reform were in response to what he perceived as a number of abuses. In his views he retained Scholastic positions on many of the subjects pointed to by Woods as indicative of the intellectual spirit of the church.

The Reformation and Enlightenment drew a veil over the medieval view of the world, and we entered a new age. Perhaps we now need a better understanding of how the post-Reformation churches became followers rather than leaders of culture, thus abdicating their true role in public intellectual life.

The term "Catholic" is used by Woods in the sense of defining the medieval church, but he also assumes a direct connection to the Roman Catholic Church of today, without this being explicitly stated. It would have been useful to distinguish this because then we could focus on the common intellectual roots of the fragmented churches of the present. The Reformation and the Counter-Reformation broke apart this shared heritage and perhaps made the church less central to the life of the West. Certainly what followed was humanism taking center stage, as secularism seized hold of defining what comprises knowledge.

The challenge for the modern church is to make its language understandable to a materialist world where words like "salvation" and "sin" have become trite. Woods emphasizes that many of the terms of progressive intellectual discourse today—ideas like justice, peace, and stewardship—are taken from the church. They are central to the teachings of Jesus, yet progressive liberals have made them their own—and it should be added that the influence of ecclesiastical liberalism has allowed them to become alienated from their roots.

There is much intellectual work to be done by conservative Christians and thinkers to recover our common tradition, a kind of intellectual archaeological dig, if you will. Woods has taken us a great step in the direction of this rediscovery. ■

David Cowan is a writer and theologian and a member of the advisory board of Regent's Park College, University of Oxford. He was formerly a chaplain at the University of Cambridge.

**Subscribe to
The American Conservative
Today.**

Simply go to
www.amconmag.com
and click "Subscribe"

or call

1-800-579-6148



For Whom Ms. Bell Tolled



Did you know that it was a woman who was responsible for the mess in Iraq? No, I'm not thinking of the hysterical Maureen Dowd and her W-baiting,

increasingly impossible to read columns. It was Gertrude Bell. She was an archaeologist and professional traveler who spoke Arabic and Persian and who was appointed to the Arab bureau in Cairo during World War I by another person who took his desires for reality, Winston Churchill. Miss Bell was rich, upper class, arrogant but well meaning, a lover of all things Arabic—including women. She eventually became Oriental Secretary to the British High Commission in Iraq, and that is when the you-know-what hit the fan.

As some of you may remember, the Brits used to rule that miserable land, which they helped make miserable, incidentally. Between the most disastrous American president ever, Woodrow Wilson, and the most self-centered and arrogant of British prime ministers, Winston Churchill, they managed to ensure that the enclaves of people they mapped out in places like Yugoslavia and Iraq would remain at each other's throats for at least a century. Ethnic boundaries are very complex affairs, as those big shots in Versailles soon found out, but they hadn't taken into account the stupidity and arrogance of the two men I've just mentioned. But back to Miss Gertrude Bell.

The reason she's responsible is her sex. Just as the Sunnis today refuse to sit down and break pita bread with the Shi'ites, the Shi'ites were left outside the tent back in the '20s because their religious leaders refused to meet face-to-face with Gertrude. "May the fleas of a thousand camels infest my armpits before I sit down with a woman," announced a Shia at the time, or words to that effect.

I'm not taking any sides here; *The American Conservative* can hardly afford to lose our lesbian subscribers, but the Shi'ite elders had a point. Appointing a woman to represent the British Empire in talks with the Mesopotamians was tantamount to sending Leni Riefenstahl as the first German ambassador to Israel.

Bell, needless to say, gave as good as she got. "I've been totally cut off from them because their tenets forbid them to look upon an unveiled woman, and my tenets don't permit me to veil," she said, adding off the record that the less clothes on a woman the better. (Hear, hear!)

Gertrude had more things to say, like how these Shi'ites lived in an atmosphere that reeked of antiquity and ignorance and that if she wore a veil it would be an admission of inferiority. (Having

Now, with a new century at hand, Uncle Sam is trying to do a Gertrude, but this time the Sunnis aren't buying. The good uncle has it worse than Miss Gertrude. A decade of sanctions has turned Iraq into a nation of criminals, and with the dissolution of the army, there is a gun under every bed. "Is that a gun in your bed or do you like me?" has become a favorite line of lovelorn Iraqis.) In the meantime, politicians like honest Ahmad Chalabi (Judith Miller's last hope for a Pulitzer) debate inside the fortified zone in a manner reminiscent of the Führer's moving around phantom divisions inside the bunker during the closing days of World War II.

And it gets worse. People used to say things will get better when Saddam is captured or when the voting begins. No longer. The whens have run out like Chalabi fleeing the Jordanian fuzz after he was caught with his hand in the cookie jar. Militias are in control outside the capital, militias that will go to war

APPOINTING A WOMAN TO REPRESENT THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN TALKS WITH THE MESOPOTAMIANS WAS TANTAMOUNT TO SENDING LENI RIEFENSTAHL AS THE FIRST GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO ISRAEL.

seen pictures of her, I don't agree. She should have worn a veil, and a very thick one at that.)

Well, we all know the results. Gertrude's and Winston's solution to sweeping away the dust of antiquity was to bring in a foreign king from the Hashemite dynasty, whose family ruled until the Baathists massacred them in 1958. (The last king of Iraq was the first cousin of the king of Jordan, and both families—at least those young ones who survived the massacre by being in school abroad—grieved together in Gstaad later that year.)

with each other as soon as the Marines leave town. It's depressing, it's sad, it's a waste, and it's worse than a crime—with compliments to Talleyrand—it's a mistake. Bush should start telling the truth and face up to the disaster. And the rest of us—except for the neocons with their agenda—should read up on history.

Wilson divided parts of the Ottoman Empire with disastrous results. Churchill in his megalomania insisted in creating a new country, Iraq. It took Tito to keep the peace in Yugoslavia, and Saddam to keep it in Iraq. Sometimes bad guys are good for countries and vice versa. ■

New Books by **JOHN LUKACS**

DEMOCRACY AND POPULISM


Fear and Hatred

"Lukacs is indisputably one of the English language's greatest . . . historians. . . . [His] prose is clear and crisp. . . . This is a wonderful book to chew on."

—Jonah Goldberg, *National Review*

"Lukacs invites us to share in a relaxed meditation on the present condition of democracy, above all in America. The style is often conversational. Instead of an argument, we are offered a series of aperçus, many of them haunting and even brilliant." —David Marquand, *New Statesman*

\$25.00



A NEW REPUBLIC

A History of the United States in the Twentieth Century


"Mr. Lukacs is an original and subtle historian, and [this book] is an engaging intellectual surprise party. . . . I was continuously enchanted by the play of his ideas—by the sharpness of his distinctions and the acuteness of his descriptions."

—Naomi Bliven, *New Yorker*

"A rich, subtle, and often ingenious argument. . . . Eloquent [and] provocative."

—Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., *Washington Post Book World*


\$19.95 paperback



Paperbacks by **JOHN LUKACS**


CHURCHILL: VISIONARY. STATESMAN. HISTORIAN.

\$15.00 A Yale Nota Bene paperback



AT THE END OF AN AGE


\$17.00 paperback



FIVE DAYS IN LONDON

May 1940


\$11.95 paperback



THE DUEL

The Eighty-Day Struggle Between Churchill and Hitler

\$15.95 paperback



THE LAST EUROPEAN WAR


September 1939–December 1941

\$19.95 paperback



A THREAD OF YEARS

\$22.00 paperback



YALE University Press
Available wherever books are sold • yalebooks.com